

SELF-ENFORCING POWERSHARING IN WEAK STATES

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Powersharing, in which elites from rival societal groups agree to share control of the central government, is found to be a key source of domestic peace—enabling states to escape devastating cycles of exclusion and civil war. Yet the conditions giving rise to inclusive governance are not well-understood. In this paper we fill this gap. In contrast to existing scholarship that emphasizes the importance of external third-party mediation or strong formal institutions, we point to the structural roots of powersharing—in which political inclusion stems from the distribution of societal power and the balance of threat capabilities it produces. Only when both the ruling group and a given rival group possess strong mobilizational capabilities, such that each could credibly threaten to recapture state power if excluded from the central government, does self-enforcing powersharing emerge. A strong rival induces the ruler to commit to powersharing and to reluctantly accept coup risk over civil war risk. The ruling group's own threat capabilities, in turn, constrain rivals from trying to convert their share of power into absolute power. Supported by extensive quantitative and qualitative evidence with particular reference to weak states in sub-Saharan Africa, the paper sheds light on the conditions under which the distribution of violence within a state underwrites a peaceful and productive equilibrium. In doing so, it rethinks how scholars approach the study of civil war—rather than conceiving of it in terms of effective resistance, it models civil war as a contest for state power shaped by groups' capabilities to project force in the capital.

Violent ethnic conflict has been one of the key causes of mass killing, economic underdevelopment, regional instability, and inter-state conflict in the world since World War II.¹ Such conflicts are particularly concentrated in weak states, which lack effective institutions to regulate the distribution of power and broadcast authority.² Yet not all weak states are plagued by ethnically-based civil wars. In some, large-scale political violence has been averted or managed through powersharing, in which rival groups agree to share control of the state.³ Understanding the sources of durable powersharing is important to address the scourge of civil war—the dominant mode of political violence in contemporary international affairs.

Existing research tends to focus on the importance of either formal institutions⁴ or external third-party intervention.⁵ While both factors can serve as key levers to reduce uncertainty, most powersharing regimes since World War II have emerged without

¹ Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008; Gurr 2000; Harff 2003; Salehyan 2009.

² Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hironaka 2005.

³ Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977; Rothchild 1997; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009.

⁴ Lijphart 1977; Magaloni, 2008; Norris 2008.

⁵ Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Walter 2002.

external intervention, and in most weak states informal institutions have greater influence than formal ones.⁶

In such quasi-anarchical environments, in which societal groups cannot rely on strong institutions or external actors to enforce powersharing, the distribution of power is ultimately determined by the threat of force.⁷ Rivals must be able to credibly threaten a rebellion that would oust the ruler should he reject or violate powersharing.⁸ But herein lies a paradox: the threat of force is necessary to hold rulers accountable and sustain powersharing but, as it can also be abused by rivals to grab and monopolize power for themselves, the shadow of violence can incite the very exclusion it seeks to deter. When does the threat of force lead to a peaceful and productive equilibrium underwritten by powersharing and when does it merely reproduce the exclusion-conflict cycle? Addressing this question is critical to understanding the foundations of political order. We argue the roots of peaceful powersharing lie in the distribution of societal power. In contrast to the international relations literature, in which the study of the balance of power has been central to theories of conflict and cooperation under anarchy,⁹

⁶ Helmke, 2004; Reno 1998.

⁷ North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Svobik 2012.

⁸ Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix and Svobik 2013; Svobik 2012.

⁹ Copeland 2000; Powell 1999.

the link between threat capabilities and war has heretofore been largely undertheorized in the comparative politics literature.

We argue that the threat of force acts as a credible deterrent against exclusion when it is backed up by strong societal power, in which a given rival group possesses the mobilizational potential to credibly threaten to recapture state power from its societal base *if it is excluded from the central government*—what we describe as a group’s *threat capabilities*. Unless a group possesses strong threat capabilities, the ruler faces minimal constraints from excluding that group and appropriating its share of power for himself and his co-ethnics. However, for powersharing to be self-enforcing, the ruling group similarly must possess strong threat capabilities—otherwise a rival group will face few constraints from exploiting access to the central government to appropriate the ruling group’s share of power.

In the absence of strong institutions to regulate self-enforcing powersharing, mutually strong threat capabilities transform the choices made in response to the coup-civil war trap that plagues weak, ethnically-divided states.¹⁰ Strong rivals commit to powersharing to avoid mutually costly civil wars, but in turn such arrangements open the door to future coups d’état. Under such conditions, interethnic powersharing is more

¹⁰ On the coup-civil war trade-off in weak, ethnically-divided states, see Roessler 2011; Roessler 2016.

likely, and violent contestation for power—when it does occur—takes the form of coups, which lead to a change in executive authority but do not significantly disrupt the relative distribution of political power.

We empirically test these theoretical expectations both qualitatively and quantitatively, focusing on sub-Saharan Africa from independence to 2013. We expect the distribution of societal power to have a particularly important effect on powersharing in post-colonial Africa given the “strong societies and weak states” political order that has emerged after decolonization.¹¹ Unable to rely on strong formal institutions to regulate society, political structure and societal peace hinges on a ruler’s ability to strike alliances and share power with Big Men embedded in rival ethnic groups.

Quantitatively, we use data from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 2014 dataset¹² and a compatible geo-referenced dataset, GeoEPR,¹³ to develop a parsimonious operationalization of threat capabilities derived from a group’s ethnic geography—its location and size as a proportion of the population—with the expectation that the larger and the closer to the capital city a group is, the more likely its members can credibly

¹¹ Migdal 1988.

¹² Vogt et al. 2015.

¹³ Vogt et al. 2015; Wucherpfennig et al. 2011.

threaten to take power if excluded from the central government. Statistical analysis of 233 politically-relevant ethnic groups in 40 sub-Saharan African countries demonstrates that ethnic powersharing is most likely when the ruling group and a non-ruling group possess strong threat capabilities. Strikingly, this is the case despite an elevated risk of coups. In contrast, when the threat capabilities of either the ruler or the rival are weak, rulers are more likely to reject powersharing. This strategy is effective at coup-proofing the regime from ethnic rivals but at an increased risk of civil war.

Qualitatively, we employ a diverse case selection approach to explore the dynamics of ethno-political bargaining, coups and civil war across different distributions of societal power. The logic of self-enforcing powersharing accounts for the puzzling historical pattern seen in Ghana and Benin, in which ethnic rivals traded executive power via coups yet no one group sought to monopolize power and coup-proof their regimes using ethno-political exclusion. This stands in stark contrast to Sudan, Liberia, and South Africa, where policies of ethno-political exclusion were chosen by rulers and their co-ethnics to monopolize their hold on power, leading to civil war.

This paper advances existing knowledge on powersharing and on civil war in several important ways. First, it offers a novel theory of self-enforcing powersharing, explaining how rival groups in weak states can credibly commit to divide economic rents and political power in a quasi-anarchic environment. While there has been a substantial

literature linking civil war to the inability of societal rivals to commit to share power,¹⁴ how groups in weak states overcome this challenge remains a key puzzle. Prior work either emphasizes exogenous policy solutions—external third-party mediation¹⁵—or attributes powersharing to formal institutions, without accounting for why elites are willing to constrain their power in the first place.¹⁶ We diverge from this and instead offer an internal, structural theory of powersharing that links it to the distribution of societal power and the balance of threat capabilities between ethnic rivals.

Second, it incorporates the study of civil war into a broader framework that considers the competing risks rulers face to their hold on power. Civil war studies, especially the study of ethnic-based conflict, continue to be dominated by a focus on grievances or opportunity structure,¹⁷ often failing to consider how rulers assess competing threats and why they are unable to simply increase concessions in the face of

¹⁴ Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Roessler 2011; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009.

¹⁵ Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Walter 2002.

¹⁶ Lijphart 1969; Magaloni 2008.

¹⁷ Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010.

an aggrieved population and weakened capacity to repress.¹⁸ A bargaining framework is essential to address these questions.¹⁹

Third, this bargaining approach leads us to challenge the conventional view of civil war as a form of “effective resistance,”²⁰ in which guerillas win by not losing.²¹ We conceive of groups mounting peripheral insurgencies holed up in distant mountainous terrain as possessing low threat capabilities; they are tolerated exactly because they are weak. The fact that most theorization of civil war draws from this stylized version of a guerilla army is problematic because it reveals a selection problem in the study of civil war—inferences are drawn disproportionately from observable (i.e., weak) insurgencies, as those groups with the greatest potential to wage violent opposition are compensated

¹⁸ Fearon 2010.

¹⁹ For earlier applications of the bargaining approach to ethnic-based conflict, see Cetinyan 2002; Fearon 1995. See also the recent contributions by Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015 and Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016, which posit that rulers are strategic in their use of powersharing and target groups with greater conflict potential.

²⁰ Sambanis 2004.

²¹ Kissinger 1969.

to not do so.²² Reconceptualizing civil war as a contest for state power, rather than as simply conflicts in which the opposition is able to avoid defeat at the hands of the government, shows that (in contrast to the conventional wisdom) strong threat capabilities underwrite peace, not conflict, as they constrain the ruler from reneging on powersharing. This represents a departure from some power parity theories of interstate conflict that suggest equal capabilities worsen information asymmetries, thus increasing the risk of bargaining failure and war.²³ While parity may obscure who will triumph in war, the high mutual costs of achieving such an outcome will be readily apparent. This will be particularly the case in the intra-state context, where decisive victory is unlikely to be achieved short of militarily vanquishing the opposing side. The shadow of total war thus pushes both sides to choose ethnic accommodation.

Fourth, this theoretical framework helps account for why large, weak states such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Chad, and Ethiopia are particularly prone to ethnic exclusion and civil war—a problem particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁴ Big states tend to contain a greater number of distant groups with accordingly

²² This is a key insight that Cetinyan 2002 makes.

²³ Reed 2003. On power parity and war, see also Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski and Kugler 1980.

²⁴ Clapham 1996; Clapham 2006; Green 2012.

low threat capabilities, which lack the ability to hold the ruler accountable for violating powersharing.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section two analyzes the problem of powersharing in weak states. Section three explores how the distribution of societal power and the balance of threat capabilities underwrite durable powersharing. The fourth and fifth sections test the threat capabilities theory of powersharing, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data, respectively. Section six concludes with the theoretical implications and identifies avenues for future research.

The Problem of Powersharing in Weak States

Powersharing entails the joint participation of elites of two or more rival groups in a governing coalition, in which both sides agree to parcel out the rents that come from control of the state and each refrains from using force to grab a larger share of power.²⁵

²⁵ We primarily employ a dyadic framework to analyze ethno-political bargaining to capture the primacy of bilateral ties in weak states, given underlying institutional and structural conditions that enable leaders to use divide-and-rule policies and selective incentives to inhibit the emergence of reliable inter-ethnic coalitions. Acemoglu, Verdier, and Robinson, 2004; Arriola 2012. In the Online Appendix we relax this assumption and analyze alternative specifications that model cross-group and coalition dynamics to take

This implies two necessary conditions. First, the leader in power must choose to bring a given rival into the government. Rather than attempt to rule the country unilaterally, keep potential opposition at arms-length, and extract all of the rents accompanying dominant control of the state apparatus, the ruler must prefer accommodation and accept the costs and risk of giving rivals positions of some power. Second, the rival group, once invited to participate in the central government, must accept its share of power and refrain from leveraging its privileged position to attempt to overthrow the government in order to gain absolute power.

In accounting for powersharing, extant research tends to focus on the role of formal institutions and external third-party mediators. The institutional approach emphasizes the importance that formal rules, such as consociational arrangements,²⁶ and political organizations, such as parties and legislatures,²⁷ play in helping to regulate the distribution of power. Such institutions guarantee minorities representation in

into account the potential relevance of the broader strategic environment. Treisman 2004; Walter 2009. Consistent with our dyadic framework, we see no evidence that levels of extant powersharing or assuming stable coalitions alter the importance of the balance of threat capabilities.

²⁶ Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O'Leary 1993.

²⁷ Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2008.

government, constrain rulers, and increase transparency, reducing fear and misperceptions about opponents' intentions. External approaches view third-party enforcers, which can both help to forge a political agreement and coerce or sanction rivals if they renege on the political agreement, as necessary to overcome the commitment problem.²⁸ These represent important contributions to the study of peacemaking in ethnically-divided states, but leave several puzzles unresolved. Empirically, most powersharing regimes since World War II have emerged without external intervention, and in many weak states politics is defined by personalistic rule with limited formal institutionalization.²⁹

²⁸ Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007.

²⁹ Helmke 2004; Jackson and Rosberg 1982. In sub-Saharan Africa, about 47 percent of non-ruling groups are included in the central government. Yet in countries that have signed an externally-brokered peace agreement in the previous year, the level of inclusion is around 27 percent. This suggests first, that external intervention targets countries with higher-levels of ethno-political exclusion and second, that those countries that have avoided war through powersharing have been able to do so without intervention, despite the weakness of formal institutions. (Peace agreement data are from Höglbladh 2012.)

In the absence of third-party intervention and strong institutions, what sustains powersharing? One of the few levers that groups can employ to hold each other accountable is the threat of violence.³⁰ However, the problem with violence as a tool of deterrence is it can also be used for offensive purposes—to not only protect one’s share of power but to usurp the power of others.³¹ Following from Hobbes, this represents the fundamental barrier to the emergence of political order.³²

Analogous to the interstate security dilemma, the inability of rival factions to credibly commit not to use force to lock-in a larger share of power is a key source of instability in weak states. In weak, ethnically-divided states this commitment problem gives rise to a coup-civil war trade-off.³³ The lack of administrative capacity to broadcast power over their territory and citizens forces weak state rulers to strike alliances with rivals to extend the reach of the regime and prevent societal-based rebellion. But bringing one’s rivals to the center of power is risky as it lowers the costs

³⁰ Svolik 2012. Wantchekon 2000, 344 notes that the “most important element of a constitution is that it depends for its enforcement...on sanctions and incentives internal to the political system.”

³¹ Jervis 1978.

³² Hobbes 1986 (1651).

³³ Roessler 2011; Roessler 2016.

they face to seize power for themselves in a coup d'état.³⁴ When rulers are uncertain of their rivals' commitment to powersharing and fearful of losing sovereign authority they often employ ethno-political exclusion in a bid to consolidate their hold on power.

Although this may lead to civil war, under certain circumstances rulers see armed rebellion from outside their government as a lesser threat than a coup from within. This model is consistent with the outbreak of a number of prominent civil wars such as the Biafran War, the Rwandan genocide, and successive civil wars in Afghanistan, as well as contemporary conflicts in South Sudan, Syria, and Iraq.³⁵ Yet this outcome is not ubiquitous. In some weak states, ruling groups have consistently chosen powersharing—

³⁴ Coups and rebellions are distinguished by the organizational basis of the anti-regime technique. Coup conspirators leverage partial control of the state resources and materiel in their bid to capture political power, whereas rebels or insurgents lack such access and build a private military organization to challenge the central government and its military.

³⁵ Hirsch and Smith 2014; Luckham 1971; Prunier 1995; Robinson 2012; Roessler 2013; Rubin 2002. South Sudan, Syria and Iraq provide direct examples of rulers choosing to violate or reject powersharing with an important rival social group as a means to protect their own hold on power, at the price of large-scale political violence.

despite an elevated (and sometimes realized) risk of coup.³⁶ What accounts for whether rival groups choose, and are able to sustain, powersharing in the shadow of the coup d'état? In the next section, we argue that the durability of powersharing is conditional on a country's ethnic geography and the balance of threat capabilities it produces between rival groups.

Threat Credibility and the Origins of Self-Enforcing Powersharing

Balance of Power and Inclusive Governance

Political exclusion is an instrument for the consolidation of power. In denying rivals access to the central government and increasing the costs they face to seize power, exclusion is a means for rulers to strengthen short-term regime security³⁷ and maximize their control of rents. We would expect such a strategy, however, to be conditional on a

³⁶ Roessler 2011 offers evidence that powersharing increases coup risk among included groups.

³⁷ Exclusion from the central government does not wholly negate the possibility of orchestrating a coup—one could try to execute a coup remotely by allying with those in the military or key strategic points within the government. But it does make it much more difficult by increasing the coordination costs anti-regime elements face.

rival's mobilizational potential.³⁸ The stronger a potentially excluded group's capacity to recapture state power from its societal base, the less appealing such a policy becomes. If pursuing ethnic dominance at the cost of civil war necessitates an expensive counter-insurgency campaign with no guarantee of success, the benefits of exclusion dissipate and may no longer outweigh the costs. Thus an outside group's societal power and threat capabilities—the coercive capacity it has independent of what it might gain from any role in government—represent the key levers it has to hold the ruler accountable if he attempts to reject or violate powersharing.

The ruler's commitment to powersharing, however, is not just a function of another group's threat capabilities but also of his own group's societal power. Unless the rival faces the same constraints as the ruling group, such that it too would face a strategically costly civil war if it tried to monopolize power after a coup, there is little preventing it from exploiting access to the central government to appropriate the ruling group's share of power. Thus, for powersharing to be self-enforcing, such that neither group has incentives to exclude the other, the costs of reneging on powersharing must constrain not just the incumbent, but constrain *in expectation* any actor that may seize power in the future. Only when both sides see little strategic benefit to choosing exclusion will

³⁸ Cetinyan 2002; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016.

each reluctantly accept powersharing. Thus, balances of power are necessary in order to discourage either side from an attempt to seize total control as well as to reassure both sides that the other is unlikely to do so. While parity can exacerbate information asymmetries and uncertainty about whom would ultimately prevail in war,³⁹ in an intra-state context, in which neither side can retreat to its sovereign territory, politically eliminating or neutralizing one's rival is unlikely to be achieved short of complete military vanquishment. The readily apparent mutual costs of such a total war will encourage ethnic accommodation.

The presence of mutually strong civil war capabilities—and the shadow of total war—does not *resolve* (initially, at least) the commitment problem at the heart of the coup-civil war trap. Without agreed-upon rules or institutions regulating the distribution and transfer of sovereign power, elites embedded in each group are still vying to control the executive (and gain the international recognition and rents that come with it), and anticipate their rivals have the same intentions. This can lead to political instability and increase coup risk.⁴⁰ Under such conditions, however, rival groups reluctantly choose to attempt powersharing and may trade executive authority via coups—which do not significantly alter the relative distribution of power—rather

³⁹ Reed 2003.

⁴⁰ Harkness 2014; Horowitz 1985.

than accept the high mutual costs associated with a war for exclusive control of the state.

This is a striking and counter-intuitive implication of the theory: mutually strong threat capabilities induce rulers to accept coup risk over civil war risk. Why would authoritarian rulers adopt a strategy that brings about such high individual political risks? This seemingly goes against a number of seminal studies on political survival, which suggest the opposite: authoritarian rulers, in an effort to secure their political and physical survival, have few qualms about using exclusion and other strategies that may be in their personal interest but which bring about devastating costs for their citizens and the state, such as economic crises, international conflict, civil war, and state collapse.⁴¹

To account for this, it is important to distinguish between the interests of the ruler and interests of the ruling group in which the ruler is embedded (and upon whose support the ruler depends to stay in power).⁴² While rulers may prefer to use exclusion to substitute coup risk for civil war risk to protect their personal hold on power, under conditions of mutually strong threat capabilities this offers little political or strategic

⁴¹ Bates 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Reno 1998; Roessler 2011.

⁴² North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009.

advantage for the ruling group as a whole, whose relative share of power is secured by its societal power but also constrained by the strength of its rival. Consequently, in the face of a devastating civil war—the costs of which would be borne by the group’s members—the ruling group is unlikely to support the ruler’s rejection of powersharing in a bid to consolidate his personal hold on power.

The same does not hold for weak groups, however, which lack the capabilities to reclaim power once displaced from the central government. For these groups, the ruler’s and the group’s interests are better aligned. A coup from their stronger rivals threatens not only the individual ruler’s position, but also the group’s relative share of power, since it lacks the strength to deter the new ruling group from monopolizing power. Under these conditions, both the ruler and the ruling group favor exclusion, and are more willing to accept the costs that come along with it.

Rethinking Civil War

In conceiving of civil war as an instrument of deterrence and lever of political accountability, we diverge from existing scholarship on the subject. Most studies equate civil war with insurgency, which Fearon and Laitin define as “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from

rural base areas.”⁴³ The success of an insurgency is often measured based on a group’s ability to effectively resist the government—that is, inflict at least a minimal level of costs while avoiding defeat.⁴⁴ As Henry Kissinger famously quipped, “the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”⁴⁵ Equating civil war with armed insurgency has led scholars to focus on those conditions that “render insurgency more feasible and attractive”⁴⁶ and make it hard for the government to effectively defeat the insurgents. Such factors include distance from the capital, sanctuary in neighboring countries, mountainous terrain, and ethnic group concentration.⁴⁷

We instead conceive of civil war as a contest for state power between the central government and an organized, armed opposition movement. Rebellion is the lever a given rival employs, or threatens to employ, to gain a share of power and rents. A group’s civil war capability, then, is its potential capacity to contest for control of state power in a dynamic and uncertain bargaining environment. This approach suggests a

⁴³ Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75.

⁴⁴ Collier 2004; Sambanis 2009.

⁴⁵ Kissinger 1969, 214.

⁴⁶ Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75.

⁴⁷ Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Salehyan 2009; Weidmann 2009.

different conception of capabilities than is conventionally used in the civil war literature. We expect groups located in remote, mountainous areas far from the capital to pose a weaker, not stronger, civil war threat. Though these factors make it difficult for the government to project power over such groups, they also inhibit the use of force in the opposite direction, constraining the group's ability to challenge the center. In contrast, we expect large groups, located closer to the capital, with control over valuable resources and economic markets, to have the greatest capacity to credibly threaten to seize control of the central government and thus lock-in a share of power.

Balance of Threat Capabilities and Powersharing: Hypotheses

We argue that strong threat capabilities produce durable (though sometimes fluid) powersharing, in which rivals prefer inclusion—even when it risks trading power via coups—to engaging in mutually costly civil wars for absolute power. This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: When both the ruling group and rival group have strong threat capabilities, the rival is included in the central government, reducing civil war risk but increasing coup risk.

When groups have asymmetric threat capabilities, however, self-enforcing powersharing is significantly less likely. While both sides may wish to divide rents and avoid costly conflict, the power differential undermines any agreement.

Most obviously, a weak group bargaining with a strong ruling group lacks the threat capabilities to hold the ruler accountable if it violates the terms of a deal. The stronger group's inability to credibly commit itself to not exploit its greater bargaining leverage induces the weaker group to stay on a war footing or face political irrelevance. This increases the likelihood of protracted conflict.⁴⁸

Additionally, because the weak group's low civil war capabilities render them unlikely to be able to reclaim power if they lose access to the central government, they are more likely to approach political bargaining as a one-shot game and adopt extreme policies (e.g., coup attempts followed by consolidating power in a repressive ethnocracy) to hold on to power at all costs. This further drives a strong group toward exclusion as it sees the marginal costs of a relatively less-threatening civil war as being significantly lower than the marginal costs of a coup. This leads to our second hypothesis:

H2: When the ruling group's threat capabilities are high and the rival group's are low, the rival is excluded from the central government, reducing coup risk but increasing the risk of civil war.

Similar dynamics lead a weak ruling group to universally reject powersharing with either a strong or a weak competitor. Again, the breakdown of powersharing arises from the weak group's limited threat capabilities and thus their political vulnerability. When bargaining with another weak group, neither side possesses the mobilizational potential

⁴⁸ Fearon 1995; Walter 2002.

to hold the other to account if they renege on powersharing. Consequently, both have strong incentives to eliminate the other from state power before they themselves are eliminated, leading to ethnic exclusion and civil war. This leads to our third hypothesis.

H3: When the ruling group's threat capabilities are low and the rival group's are also low, the rival is excluded from the central government, reducing coup risk but increasing the risk of civil war.

When the competing group is strong, a weak ruling group faces a more acute dilemma. Powersharing puts the stronger rival in a position to usurp power in a coup, likely leading to the permanent exclusion of the weak group. But employing exclusion to prevent such an outcome provokes a strategically costly civil war. Both are bad outcomes, but losing power via civil war is seen as more uncertain than in a coup in which its rival already controls a significant share of the state. This leads to our fourth hypothesis.

H4: When the ruling group's threat capabilities are low and the rival group's are high, the rival is excluded from the central government, reducing coup risk but increasing the risk of civil war.

Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical predictions and how they align with H1-H4

Figure 1: Threat Capabilities, Self-Enforcing Powersharing and Coup and Civil War Risk

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p>H1: Powersharing and societal peace (despite high coup risk)</p> <p><i>Powersharing: Yes</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: High</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: Low</i></p>	<p>H2: War-prone ethnocracies</p> <p><i>Powersharing: No</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: Low</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: High</i></p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p>H4: Repressive minority rule (or unstable powersharing)</p> <p><i>Powersharing: No</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: Low</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: High</i></p>	<p>H3: Unstable, violent, exclusionary regimes</p> <p><i>Powersharing: No</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: Low</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: High</i></p>

Quantitative Empirical Evidence

To assess the threat capabilities theory of powersharing, we focus our analysis on the subset of states in sub-Saharan Africa. While we expect the argument to apply to all weak states with strong, spatially-concentrated societal groups, sub-Saharan Africa provides a set of comparable states which meet these criteria, with consistent societal

data on access to state power⁴⁹ as well as the ethnicity of those groups launching rebellions and executing coups.⁵⁰

There are two primary reasons we would expect the theory to be particularly relevant to African states. First, the “strong societies and weak states” problem is a defining characteristic of the political order that emerged after decolonization.⁵¹ Unable to rely on strong state structures to broadcast power, rulers have needed to strike powersharing deals with ethnic rivals.⁵² Second, politics in post-independence Africa has centered almost completely on control of the central government. The decision by African heads of states at the founding of the Organization of African Unity in the early 1960s to accept the inviolability of colonial state borders has contributed to strong norms and institutions against state partition, reducing the viability of exit as a policy response to marginalization or discrimination compared to other regions in the world.⁵³

⁴⁹ Wimmer et al. 2009.

⁵⁰ Roessler 2011.

⁵¹ Englebert 2002; Herbst 2000; Migdal 1988.

⁵² Rothchild 1986; Rothchild 1987.

⁵³ Englebert and Hummel 2005.

Consequently, even the most peripheral groups have had to target control of the central government as a means of addressing their material grievances.⁵⁴

To test our main hypotheses, we estimate models of interethnic powersharing, coups, and civil war using the Ethnic Power Relations 2014 dataset of ethnic groups in 40 African states from 1946 to 2013.⁵⁵ The EPR dataset draws from a survey of country-experts to provide information on the inclusion or exclusion of politically relevant ethnic groups in central governments across countries in which ethnicity is politically salient. Because it does not restrict its analysis to only cabinet posts, but also to representation within the executive and the military (depending on its de facto power in a given country), it captures well the actual power structure. Since the theory is about the interaction between the ruling group and a given rival group, the unit of analysis is a given incumbent group-non-incumbent group dyad-year, with models including all

⁵⁴ An increase in support for secession by revisionist neighboring states would change the bargaining dynamics by strengthening the power of peripheral groups, though potentially at the cost of increasing risk of inter-state war as seen between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 and 1978.

⁵⁵ Vogt et al. 2015. We use EPR 2014 available at <https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/>.

Alternative models showing similar results with EPR 3.0 are provided in the Online Appendix. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009.

politically-relevant ethnic groups in relation to the ruling group. Ruling groups are those identified as being politically-dominant, or having the most politically powerful status (generally, though not always, this corresponds to the ethnic group of the executive).⁵⁶

As we are interested in whether particular binary outcomes do or do not occur, we use a logistic regression specification with standard errors clustered by country to account for non-independence of ongoing political relationships within states. To account for temporal dependence within outcomes, each model includes the cubic polynomial of the dependent variable to approximate the hazard.⁵⁷

Variables

There are three dependent variables of interest. The first, interethnic powersharing, is operationalized using a measure of whether a given non-ruling group was included in a governing coalition in that year. The dichotomous variable, *Ethnic powersharing*, takes a value of 1 if the non-ruling group was included in government (coded as monopoly,

⁵⁶ When there are multiple senior partners in government, we code whichever group controls the executive as the ruling group. For a list of ruling groups and non-ruling groups by country-year see the Online Appendix.

⁵⁷ Carter and Signorino 2010.

dominant, senior partner or junior partner) and a 0 if it was not (coded as regional autonomy, separatist, powerless, or discriminated).⁵⁸

The second dependent variable, successful coup, identifies whether members of a given group were key conspirators in a successful coup attempt that year.⁵⁹ The dichotomous variable, *Successful coup*, takes a value of 1 if there was at least one successful coup and 0 if there was not.

The third dependent variable, group rebellion onset, identifies whether members of a given ethnic group initiated a major armed rebellion or insurgency against the central government in a given year.⁶⁰ The dichotomous variable *Group rebellion* takes a value of 1 if members of the group launched a rebellion in a given year and 0 if not.

⁵⁸ We model ethnic powersharing as an incidence variable (that is, we do not drop ongoing years of inclusion) to capture the dynamic and continuous nature of political bargaining.

⁵⁹ Coup data from Roessler 2011, updated through 2013.

⁶⁰ This measure captures the year a significant number of members of a given group became involved in a civil war with a minimum of 1000 battlefield deaths. Roessler 2011. We have updated the data through 2013. We also estimated models using measures of low-level group rebellion onset from ACD2EPR 2014 Vogt et al. 2015, with substantively similar results.

To proxy threat capabilities, we develop a measure based on two factors that determine a group’s mobilizational potential to threaten the central government. First, the larger the size of a group, the more popular power it can wield and the larger the rebellion or uprising it can mobilize.⁶¹ To measure this, we use the group’s proportion of the state’s total population—*Group size*.⁶² Second, the more proximate a group is to the center of power, the lower the mobilizational costs necessary to seize control of the state apparatus. To measure this, we calculate the *Centroid distance* in kilometers between the capital city and the centroid of the ethnic group’s homeland.⁶³ These variables are

⁶¹ One barrier to mobilization larger groups face more acutely than smaller ones, however, is stronger collective action problems. Although not an insignificant obstacle, we nonetheless expect that (all else equal) representing a larger share of the population increases, rather than decreases, a group’s capacity to take control of the central government; in other words, the benefits of a broad societal base outweigh the greater difficulties of coordination. To the degree this assumption is incorrect, it should introduce bias against our expected findings, and thus does not undermine the interpretation of the results.

⁶² Vogt et al. 2015.

⁶³ Results are nearly identical when using the minimum distance between the capital and the group’s territory, as shown in the Online Appendix. For the geocoded EPR groups,

normalized⁶⁴ and the distance data are reversed so larger groups and closer groups have higher values. We then take the arithmetic mean of the distance and size variables to create a continuous *Threat capabilities* variable that ranges from 0.03 (least threatening) to 0.97 (most threatening).⁶⁵ The variable *Ruler threat capabilities* measures the capabilities of the ruling group for a given year using the same approach.

see Vogt et al. 2015; Wucherpfennig et al. 2011. One dimension missing from this variable that warrants further analysis is how overlapping ethnic homelands and ethnic homogeneity may affect mobilizational capabilities.

⁶⁴ As size is measured as a group's proportion of a given country's total population, it is essentially already normalized. Distance is normalized by an absolute distance for all groups in the sample (the furthest distance between any group's centroid and a capital city, which happens to be the Makonde-Yao in Mozambique and Maputo). As we explain below, we normalize distance the same for all groups across the continent to reflect the absolute nature of projecting power across space. In the Online Appendix, we re-run the results using distance normalized at the country-level (the distance between the capital and the furthest group in a given country). The results are generally similar, though slightly weaker across most models.

⁶⁵ The median value of *Threat capabilities* across all ethnic groups in our dataset is 0.48. The median values of *Group size* and *Centroid distance* are 0.1 and 348, respectively.

Using this coding of rival and ruling group threat capabilities, we construct our key independent variable—the *Balance of threat capabilities* between the ruling group and a given competitor. For ease of interpretation, and because we do not expect the joint effect to necessarily be continuous,⁶⁶ the balance of threat capabilities measure is captured through four interaction dummy variables (following Figure 1) based on whether the ruling group and a given rival have threat capabilities scores above or below the median for all groups in sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁷ Not surprisingly, LH dyads are

⁶⁶ What matters in expectation is not only the relative threat capabilities of the ruler and potential competitor but, when threat capabilities are asymmetric, which has the stronger threat capabilities. A pure continuous interaction term does not allow us to unpack this categorical effect. In addition, it would inaccurately label asymmetric dyads with one exceptionally strong side as having mutually high threat capabilities.

⁶⁷ We use the continent median of threat capabilities to construct these quad categories rather than a country median to reflect the fact that power projection is a function of both absolute and relational attributes. Whereas size is relational (as any group's size of the population is inversely related to other groups in the country), the logistics of overcoming distance are more absolute (a group's ability to project power in the capital across a fixed distance is not affected by the distance other groups must traverse). Using a common cutpoint for distance allows for the possibility that in some countries,

least common, while HH and HL dyads (where the ruling group is strong) are most common.

Figure 2: Distribution of Ruling Group-Rival Group Dyads by Balance of Threat Capabilities across sub-Saharan Africa, Independence-2013

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<i>High-High (HH) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 2,652</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 36%</i>	<i>High-Low (HL) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 3,089</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 42%</i>
Weak Ruling Group	<i>Low-High (LH) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 617</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 8%</i>	<i>Low-Low (LL) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 1,067</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 14%</i>

especially large ones, most or all groups have low threat capabilities while in others, especially small countries, most or all groups have high threat capabilities. Whereas this points to country size as an important determinant of threat capabilities, we show in the Online Appendix that the results are robust to controlling for country area or pre-colonial population density and trade—two factors that Green 2011 finds account for the size and shape of African states.

To evaluate the effect of these various configurations of balance of threat capabilities on powersharing, coups, and civil war, we estimate specifications containing a number of control variables that account for alternative explanations of these outcomes:⁶⁸

- *GDP per capita*: income-level and state capacity; (lagged) natural log of GDP per capita in that state-year.⁶⁹
- *Log country population*: population size; (lagged) natural log of the total population of the state.⁷⁰
- *Number of ethnic groups*: country's ethnic diversity; number of politically-relevant ethnic groups at independence.⁷¹
- *Institutionalized regime*: institutionalization of political power and the stabilizing effects of party rule; dummy measure of whether a given country is governed by a constitutionally-based regime (single-party, multi-party, or full democracy) versus military government.⁷²

⁶⁸ Unless specified, variables come from the EPR 2014 dataset.

⁶⁹ Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015.

⁷⁰ Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015.

⁷¹ In the Online Appendix we also test for the effect of a country's variation in elevation and land quality, which Michalopoulos 2012 finds is an important determinant of social fractionalization.

⁷² Magaloni 2008; Magaloni, Chu, and Min 2013.

- *Former French colony*: France’s proactive and interventionist foreign policies in their former colonies;⁷³ dummy measure of a whether a given country was a former French colony.
- *Cold War*: increase in externally-brokered powersharing governments in Africa since the end of the Cold War; dummy measure of whether the year is after 1990.
- *Pastcoup*: a dummy variable indicating if members of a given group had launched a successful coup in the past;⁷⁴
- *Pastconflict*: a dummy variable indicating if members of a given group had launched a large-scale rebellion in the past;
- *Ongoing rebellion*: ongoing civil wars; whether there is an ongoing rebellion in the country in the previous year.⁷⁵
- *Year*: time trends; the year.

Results

The statistical results provide strong support for the paper’s central argument that mutually strong threat capabilities promote powersharing. The models estimate the likelihood that members of a given *non-ruling group* are: included in the central government (Table 1); lead conspirators in a successful coup (Table 2); or significant participants in initiating or joining an armed rebellion (Table 3). Since HH dyads are of primary theoretical interest, we estimate models isolating this type (with all others

⁷³ Clapham 1996.

⁷⁴ McGowan 2003.

⁷⁵ Roessler 2011 updated through 2013.

combined as the reference category) as well as models including all other types individually (with HH omitted as the reference category).⁷⁶

As shown in Table 1, our first hypothesis is broadly supported. HH dyads are significantly more likely to feature interethnic powersharing (models EP-1, EP-3, and EP-5). In contrast, HL and LL dyads are statistically significantly less likely to lead to inclusion when compared to HH dyads (models EP-2, EP-4, and EP-6). Consistent with the theorized bargaining dynamics, this suggests a group's inability to credibly threaten the center reduces horizontal accountability and an equitable distribution of power. Only two other variables are found to have a robust effect on powersharing: party

⁷⁶ Because we are interested in the balance of threat capabilities and the influence this has on the strategic relationships, rather than the individual threat capabilities of specific groups themselves, we do not include the separate, continuous threat capabilities variables in the specification. Including these individual capabilities scores for both ruling and rival groups in robustness models does not affect the statistical or substantive results for our variables of interest. Models including HL, LH, and LL indicators with HH as the omitted reference category provide results which are mathematically equivalent to, and easier to interpret than, an interaction specification including the HH category and separate indicators for high threat capability status of ruling and rival groups.

institutionalization and the time trend. The former suggests that institutionalized regimes can support powersharing even under conditions of unfavorable ethnic geography, whereas the latter suggests that more governments have become more amenable to powersharing regimes over time. Both of these dynamics require further analysis to disentangle how weak states can escape adverse societal balances of power. The origins of institutionalized regimes, especially under disadvantageous power configurations, remain poorly understood.

Table 1: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Powersharing

	EP-1	EP-2	EP-3	EP-4	EP-5	EP-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	1.22*** (0.35)		0.62*** (0.21)		0.62*** (0.22)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-1.44*** (0.46)		-0.70*** (0.26)		-0.67** (0.26)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.26 (0.45)		-0.02 (0.34)		-0.11 (0.35)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.18*** (0.40)		-0.78*** (0.27)		-0.94*** (0.30)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					0.22 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)
<i>Log country population</i>					0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					0.80*** (0.27)	0.77*** (0.28)
<i>Former French colony</i>					0.63* (0.33)	0.59* (0.32)
<i>Cold War</i>					-0.48 (0.37)	-0.46 (0.38)
<i>Year</i>					0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
<i>t</i>			-2.10*** (0.16)	-2.09*** (0.16)	-1.85*** (0.14)	-1.84*** (0.14)
<i>t²</i>			0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-0.56 (0.34)	0.65 (0.23)	4.44 (0.37)	5.05 (0.34)	-83.20 (24.79)	-83.86 (25.07)
N	7404	7404	7404	7404	7127	7127
states	40	40	40	40	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.06	0.07	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.78

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates. The sample includes all politically-relevant non-ruling group-years in 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from independence (or 1946 for older states) through 2013. The dependent variable is whether the group's representatives were represented in the central government at the *Junior Partner* level or above (EPR 2014). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and the given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

The second part of the argument posits that while mutually strong threat capabilities produce self-enforcing powersharing, they merely shift, rather than resolve, the coup-civil war trap that plagues weak, ethnically-divided states. Strong rivals commit to powersharing even as it opens the door to future coups d'état. Relative to the prospects of a mutually costly civil war if any side was to try to rule unilaterally, trading power via coups is a preferable outcome. The ruling group knows that should a rival successfully seize control over the executive office, it will nonetheless be unlikely to risk civil war and will be forced to restore powersharing in the future, resulting in a marginal, rather than absolute, shift in rents from power. Table 2 shows that, consistent with this expectation, we find that successful coups are statistically significantly more likely in ethnic dyads characterized by mutually high threat capabilities (models SC-1, SC-3, and SC-5), particularly compared to HL dyads (models SC-2, SC-4, and SC-6).⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Coups are very infrequent in LL dyads as well, consistent with our theoretical expectations. The only coup in an LL dyad was the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 2001. Given the few number of LL dyads, however, this result tends to be more sensitive to model specification choices than HL dyads.

Table 2: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Successful Coup

	SC-1	SC-2	SC-3	SC-4	SC-5	SC-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	1.77*** (0.59)		1.59*** (0.59)		1.15* (0.63)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-2.84*** (0.82)		-2.73*** (0.83)		-2.28** (0.91)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.32 (0.60)		-0.13 (0.59)		-0.33 (0.63)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.76*** (0.68)		-1.33** (0.53)		-0.89 (0.67)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					-0.40 (0.34)	-0.50 (0.35)
<i>Log country population</i>					-0.14 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.19)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					-0.14 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					0.71 (0.43)	0.70* (0.42)
<i>Former French colony</i>					0.29 (0.39)	0.21 (0.40)
<i>Cold War</i>					-0.01 (0.85)	-0.00 (0.87)
<i>Year</i>					-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
<i>Past Coup</i>					1.48*** (0.51)	1.29** (0.52)
<i>t</i>			-0.28*** (0.10)	-0.29*** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.23** (0.09)
<i>t²</i>			0.01** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-6.27 (0.53)	-4.50 (0.26)	4.49 (0.72)	-2.87 (0.41)	103.35 (59.46)	104.20** (58.91)
N	7415	7415	7415	7415	7137	7137
states	40	40	40	40	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.14

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates. The sample includes all politically-relevant non-ruling group-years in 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from independence (or 1946 for older states) through 2013. The dependent variable is whether the group carried out a successful coup. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and the given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last successful coup (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

The final set of models tests the effect of the balance of threat capabilities on civil war risk. We expect the inverse of the results from the coup models: as strong rivals share power and accept coup risk, they reduce the likelihood either side will choose to militarily challenge the state from outside of the central government. Thus, we expect armed rebellion to be more likely in dyads in which at least one bargaining partner is weak, as rulers see exclusion as a means to increase the costs their rivals face to displacing them from power. As shown in Table 3, the results support this expectation. The balance of threat capabilities variables are generally statistically significant and have the (expected) opposite signs: HH dyads are negatively associated, and other dyads positively associated, with the onset of rebellion.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ The slightly less robust statistical significance in the civil war models may be a result of a non-monotonic effect of mobilizational capabilities on actual civil wars. Up to a point, greater ability to launch a civil war presumably makes a rival group more likely to do so, but beyond that threshold (we theorize) they are threatening enough to be included, and thus their likelihood drops.

Table 3: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Civil War Onset

	CW-1	CW-2	CW-3	CW-4	CW-5	CW-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	-0.88** (0.43)		-0.88** (0.43)		-0.77** (0.39)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		0.73 (0.54)		0.70 (0.54)		0.53 (0.44)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		1.05** (0.50)		1.11** (0.49)		1.07** (0.47)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		1.16** (0.45)		1.20*** (0.43)		1.12** (0.51)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					-0.65*** (0.21)	-0.68*** (0.19)
<i>Log country population</i>					0.04 (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					-0.06 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.11)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					-0.25 (0.45)	-0.17 (0.40)
<i>Former French colony</i>					-0.05 (0.54)	-0.13 (0.54)
<i>Cold War</i>					-0.96 (0.83)	-0.95 (0.82)
<i>Year</i>					0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Ongoing Rebellion</i>					0.35 (0.73)	0.35 (0.68)
<i>Past Conflict</i>					-0.32 (0.61)	-0.33 (0.61)
<i>t</i>			-0.06 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>			0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-4.51 (0.25)	-5.39 (0.38)	-4.10 (0.46)	-4.97 (0.68)	-83.00 (53.71)	-77.27 (55.44)
N	7422	7422	7422	7422	7144	7144
states	40	40	40	40	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.06

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates. The sample includes all politically-relevant non-ruling group-years in 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from independence (or 1946 for older states) through 2013. The dependent variable is whether the group initiated a major armed rebellion or insurgency against the central government. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and the given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last rebellion onset (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***, $p < 0.01$, **, $p < 0.05$, and *, $p < 0.10$

The findings are substantively important as well. Figure 4 reports predicted probabilities of inclusion, successful coups, and group rebellion (from Models EP-6, SC-6, and CW-6) using the Clarify statistical software and keeping all control variables at representative levels.⁷⁹ The substantive results align closely with the expectations presented in Figure 1. For dyads in which the ruling group and a given rival possess threat capabilities above the median of all groups in the sample, the likelihood of the rival group being included in the central government is approximately 63%, compared to 35-40% in HL and LH dyads. Meanwhile, coup risk in HH dyads is six-fold higher than in HL dyads and twice as high than in LL dyads, and civil war risk in HH dyads is lower than other types by one half to two thirds. The substantive results also illustrate

⁷⁹ King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000. These predicted probabilities are generated setting all control variables to their mean values and omitting the cubic polynomial variables from these calculations because their extreme right-skew leads to distorted (unrealistically low) predicted probabilities of all outcomes when included. The relationship of interest is consistent regardless of values chosen for other variables: HH dyads are more likely to feature powersharing and coups, and less likely to feature civil war onset.

the strategic challenges that arise in LH dyads, as weak ruling groups bargaining with stronger groups face both elevated coup and civil war risk.

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Powersharing, Coups and Armed Rebellion

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p>H1:</p> <p><i>P(Powersharing): 62.9%</i></p> <p><i>P(Successful coup): 0.6%</i></p> <p><i>P(Armed rebellion): 0.4%</i></p>	<p>H2:</p> <p><i>P(Powersharing): 35.3%</i></p> <p><i>P(Successful coup): 0.1%</i></p> <p><i>P(Armed rebellion): 0.7%</i></p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p>H4:</p> <p><i>P(Powersharing): 55.8%</i></p> <p><i>P(Successful coup): 0.4%</i></p> <p><i>P(Armed rebellion): 1.1%</i></p>	<p>H3:</p> <p><i>P(Powersharing): 39.9%</i></p> <p><i>P(Successful coup): 0.3%</i></p> <p><i>P(Armed rebellion): 1.2%</i></p>

Summary

Overall the quantitative evidence offers strong support for a threat capabilities theory of powersharing,⁸⁰ which brings a new perspective on old debates on balance of

⁸⁰ The empirical results hold when subjected to a number of robustness tests and sensitivity analyses (see Online Appendix), including: alternative construction of threat capabilities measure (employing geometric mean and using a group’s minimum distance

power, bargaining, and war. In contrast to economic theories, which predict rulers should prefer to share power with small, weak groups to maximize their control of rents,⁸¹ or power parity theories that predict an equal distribution of power increases the risk of war due to greater uncertainty about who will ultimately win,⁸² we find that strong rivals—as measured by their capabilities to project power in the capital city—are

to capital city); controlling for cross-group or coalition effects (i.e., the effect of other groups being included or excluded in the central government); employing alternative measures of ethnic geography (using Fearon’s dataset on ethnic diversity Fearon 2003, combined with ethnic geographic data taken from Ethnologue maps) to ensure the results are not an artifact of EPR’s identification of group boundaries; limiting the analysis to only those ethnic configurations that exist at the end of colonial rule to mitigate endogeneity concerns about the effects of post-colonial political bargaining on ethnic configurations; controlling for determinants of country shape and size and social fractionalization; controlling for colonial type and transnational ethnic kin; controlling for cross-cutting non-ethnic social cleavages between groups; and using all coup attempts instead of successful coups in coup models.

⁸¹ Bates 1983.

⁸² Reed 2003.

significantly more likely to share power. Notably, this holds despite the fact that powersharing also brings an elevated coup risk.

In contrast, when a rival is weak and unable to credibly hold the ruler to account for renegeing on powersharing, exclusion results. This significantly lowers coup risk, though at the cost of a higher risk of civil war, especially when the ruling group is weak. Rulers seem to calculate that the strategic benefits of ethno-political exclusion outweigh the strategic costs, and are willing to tolerate the potential threat of an armed rebellion. For weak ruling groups bargaining with strong groups, they are between a rock and a hard place—both powersharing and exclusion are dangerous as they leave the government vulnerable to coups and strong civil wars, respectively. The empirical record suggests weak groups employ a mix of strategies—some favor exclusion and others inclusion—each of which has high costs. Consequently, these dyads experience both high coup risk (nearly on par with HH dyads) but also high civil war risk (on par with LL dyads).

Qualitative Empirical Evidence

The quantitative evidence suggests systematic support for the effect of the balance of societal power on ethno-political bargaining. To further substantiate the paper's four hypotheses, we now turn to qualitative evidence. Figure 2 identifies representative regime types consistent with our four hypotheses. To explore the full range of

predictions, we employ a diverse case selection method—drawing on typical cases from each quadrant.⁸³ While these cases do not in themselves constitute a definitive test, they are able to illustrate the theorized causal mechanisms in action.

Figure 4: Balance of Threat Capabilities and Powersharing in Africa

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p>H1: Powersharing and societal peace (despite high coup risk)</p> <p>Examples: Benin (1965-1968;1991-1996) Ghana (1957-present) Kenya (1963-present)</p>	<p>H2: War-prone ethnocracies</p> <p>Examples: Ethiopia (before 1991) Mali (1960-present) Sudan (1956-present)</p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p>H4: Repressive minority rule (or unstable powersharing)</p> <p>Examples: Guinea-Bissau (1974-1980) South Africa (before 1994) Ethiopia (after 1991)</p>	<p>H3: Unstable, violent, exclusionary regimes</p> <p>Examples: Zaire/DRC (1960-present) Chad (1980-present) Liberia (1980-1998)</p>

H1: High-High (HH) Threat Capabilities: Ghana and Benin

In countries where multiple groups with strong threat capabilities dominate politics, we expect consistent, if uneasy, powersharing. Though any one group may prefer to

⁸³ Seawright and Gerring 2008.

dominate the central government, its ability to do so is constrained by the strategic costs and benefits of exclusion. Ghana and Benin represent two cases in which the main axis of political competition has been between strong ethnic groups based on size and proximity to the capital. Both countries are relatively small in area (below the median for Africa) and are divided between four relatively large ethnic or ethno-regional blocs,⁸⁴ giving each substantial societal power and making it challenging for any one group to rule alone.

In both cases control of the state and its associated rents largely played out between elites embedded in these rival groups, who mobilized their co-ethnics in a bid to maximize their power vis-à-vis their rivals. Despite the existence of formal party structures, this dynamic often played out through informal or personalist channels.⁸⁵ The high-stakes contest between ethno-regional rivals for control of state power made

⁸⁴ In Benin, the EPR dataset identifies the key groups as: Northern (15 percent of population), Southwestern (15 percent), Southeastern (18.5 percent), and South/Central (33 percent of population). In Ghana, the four largest groups are Ewe (13 percent of population), Asante (Akan) (15 percent), Northern Groups (23.5 percent), and Other Akans (34.5 percent). A fifth group, the Ga-Adangbe (8 percent), is also politically-relevant.

⁸⁵ Chazan 1982; Decalo 1995; Ronen 1975; Smock and Smock 1975.

politics in Benin and Ghana similar in kind to many other weak states. The difference lay in their rulers' inability to employ ethno-political exclusion as a means to lock-in state power, thus creating vulnerability to coups d'état from ethnic rivals. In fact, both countries experienced five successful inter-ethnic coups (in which at least some of the conspirators hailed from a different ethnic group than the head of state) in the first decades after independence.

This is not to suggest that some rulers did not try to structure their regimes along ethnic lines in a bid to consolidate power. But when they did, consistent with our theory, we see evidence that such a policy provoked popular mobilization from a strong rival, which, raising the specter of civil war, reversed ethnic exclusion. A paradigmatic example of this is found in Benin in the first few years after independence. Benin's inaugural president, Hubert Maga, hailed from the Northern group⁸⁶ and formed an unstable alliance with various leaders from the south. As these alliances frayed due to political conflicts between rival ethnic elites, Maga moved to consolidate his hold on power by promoting "northerners in large numbers...throughout the entire governmental system, and the gendarmerie, in particular, was packed with Baribas who often regarded

⁸⁶ In Benin, the Northern group's threat capabilities score falls just below the Africa median (0.465 vs 0.476); it is relatively large in size (66th percentile for Africa) but relatively far from the capital (36th percentile for Africa).

themselves as Maga's private militia."⁸⁷ But in the face of what were perceived as discriminatory practices combined with austerity measures in the public sector, southerners, led by the trade unions, launched a general strike and paralyzed the country's largest cities along the southern coast of the country, Porto Novo (the official capital) and Cotonou (the seat of government). As the conflict intensified, "Colonel Christopher Soglo, Chief of Staff of the Army [a Fon from South/Central group], announced that the armed forces were taking over power *in order to avert civil war*."⁸⁸ Soglo's coup not only prevented civil war but upheld an inclusive equilibrium. Though Maga's Northern group was politically marginalized, they were never fully purged from the military. Overall powersharing endured, but given the weakness of political institutions, irregular competition for executive authority continued. Over the next decade there would be another five coups, including three that involved military officers from the Northern group, who exploited their continued presence in the military to stay in the political game. While trading power via coups can lead to instability and

⁸⁷ Decalo 1973, 458.

⁸⁸ Emphasis added. Matthews 1966, 152.

uncertainty, these cases illustrate how the societal strength of rivals may force ruling groups to accept such an outcome over civil war.⁸⁹

H2: High-Low (HL) Threat Capabilities: Sudan

For strong groups bargaining with weak groups, the strategic problems arising from consolidating power through ethno-political exclusion are less acute. Once their rivals are excluded they pose little threat to the regime's hold on power, except through remote armed rebellions. Sudan is the archetypical example of this pathway to ethno-political exclusion and civil war. After independence the Sudanese state was dominated by those primarily from three riverine Arab tribes (Shaygiyya, Ja'alín, and Danagla) who 'inherited' the state from British colonial rule. Situated in the Nile River Valley just above the capital, Khartoum, and collectively comprising some 15 percent of the population (and scored as having high threat capabilities), these groups have dominated power in Sudan. Helping to consolidate their hold on power has been an alliance with other Arab tribes located in the heart of the state in Kordofan and Al-Gezira State (also

⁸⁹ Given this inefficiency, we might expect mutually strong rivals to attempt to institutionalize the rotation of power rather than continue with the coup trap.

Interestingly, this is precisely what has happened in Benin and Ghana as the countries have emerged as two of Africa's most enduring democracies.

scored as having high threat capabilities), historically the country's two dominant economic zones of production. Sudan's 'Arab'-dominated regimes left little room for smaller non-Arab ethnic groups located in Darfur and South Sudan (including the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Nuba, Fur, and Zaghawa, all scored as having low threat capabilities). De facto policies of ethno-political exclusion helped to consolidate the riverine Arabs hold on power, though at the cost of multiple civil wars.⁹⁰ Yet given the size of the country and the fractionalization of society—that the rebels sought to overcome but never successfully did—the insurgents were unable to mount a credible threat to the government's hold on the capital. Instead, the conflicts burned on the periphery with the costs disproportionately borne by the excluded groups—leading one Sudan observer to characterize them as a “perfect war” for the ruling elite.⁹¹ Only through heavy international pressure, third-party intervention between the central government and southern-based rebel groups and the rare case of state partition did Sudan's longest running war finally end with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and secession for South Sudan in 2011.

H3: Low-Low (HL) Threat Capabilities: Liberia

⁹⁰ Johnson 2011.

⁹¹ Martin 2002.

The Liberia case illustrates the pattern in which elites embedded in two weak groups far from the capital are unable to maintain powersharing, leading to ethnic exclusion and civil war. In 1980 a group of non-commissioned officers, led by Samuel Doe, seized power in a coup, upending the country's power structure which had been dominated by the Americo-Liberians for the previous 153-years. Doe's political position was much weaker than that of riverine Arabs in Sudan. Coming from a relatively small ethnic group in the hinterland (the Krahn tribe located primarily in Grand Gedeh County, scored as having weak threat capabilities), Doe's political base was relatively narrow. This increased his vulnerability while weakening his group's capabilities to come back to power if it lost hold of it. Doe rose to power, however, backed by individuals from other small ethnic groups in the hinterland, particularly the Gio tribe located in Nimba County (also scored as having weak threat capabilities) and led by his high school friend, Thomas Quiwonkpa. Both sides thus had a lot to lose from infighting. But each also recognized that their small power base made them vulnerable. When a power struggle arose between the two shortly after coming to power, Doe felt he could not afford to allow Quiwonkpa to remain head of the army and purged him.

Fearing for his life, Quiwonkpa fled the capital. Bitter that the man he put in power betrayed him, Quiwonkpa sought to organize support from his co-ethnics and other allies to try to forcibly reclaim power. In 1985, Quiwonkpa launched an attack on the

Liberian government from Sierra Leone. Though Quiwonkpa reached the capital with his small force of some two dozen men, they lacked the capabilities and local support to overthrow Doe.⁹² After Quiwonkpa's failed bid to oust Doe from power, the latter continued to reject powersharing with Quiwonkpa's co-ethnics while increasing his reliance on repression to regulate the excluded group. This provoked a civil war in 1989 when Quiwonkpa's lieutenants launched a rebellion to continue the revolutionary struggle started by their patron.⁹³

H4: Low-High (LH) Threat Capabilities: Guinea-Bissau and South Africa

Guinea-Bissau, like Liberia before the overthrow of Americo-Liberian rule, was dominated by a non-indigenous minority. In Guinea-Bissau, the inaugural government was controlled politically by Cape Verdeans (numbering only in the thousands) who had been brought in from the islands during the colonial period to work in the bureaucracy.⁹⁴ Enjoying the modernizing effects of participating in the colonial state, the Cape Verdeans would play a leadership role in the anti-colonial movement (P.A.I.G.C.) and the inaugural government. Though the government was led by the Cape Verdeans, the military, especially the lower-ranks, was dominated by individuals from the Balanta, the

⁹² Ellis 1999.

⁹³ Ellis 1999.

⁹⁴ Forrest 1992.

largest ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau, comprising some thirty percent of the population (scored as having high threat capabilities). The Balanta resented their subordinate political status.⁹⁵ In 1980 the Balanta-dominated military backed a coup that dismantled Cape Verdian rule.

The Guinea-Bissau case reveals one of the fundamental dilemmas confronting minority rule regimes. Reluctant to open the door for their stronger rivals in a way that might initiate a permanent shift in the distribution of power, rulers favor exclusion. But exclusion foments resistance and necessitates repression to counter the greater civil war capabilities of the majority. The problem for the minority group is that they often lack the manpower to effectively counter-mobilize and may have little choice but to employ members of the rival majority group to man the coercive apparatus. Without strong organizational control over the military, this can be the minority group's undoing, as the Cape Verdeans experienced (the same fate befell the Americo-Liberians in 1980).

The Afrikaners in South Africa chose an alternate approach. Benefitting from a much larger size (roughly ten percent of the population), though still a significant minority (and still scored as having low threat capabilities relative to other groups in Africa), they institutionalized segregation via Apartheid, including in the military, to

⁹⁵ Forrest 1987.

consolidate their hold on power.⁹⁶ This effectively blocked any internal risk posed by ‘non-whites’, even as they had to rely more and more on black South Africans in the military in the 1970s.⁹⁷ Ultimately, this provoked societal resistance that crossed the threshold of civil war in the 1980s.⁹⁸

Both Guinea-Bissau and South Africa reveal the acute strategic dilemma that minorities face in attempting to rule over larger groups. Trying to partially accommodate their ethnic rivals can lead to a coup d’état, but excluding them can provoke civil war.

Conclusion

A large and growing literature points to the pacifying effects of powersharing.⁹⁹ Yet the conditions giving rise to inclusive governance are not well-understood. In this paper

⁹⁶ Beinart 2001.

⁹⁷ Beinart 2001; Horowitz 1991.

⁹⁸ Wood 2000.

⁹⁹ Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010;

Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1969; Rothchild 1997; Wimmer 2013; Wimmer, Cederman, and

Min 2009; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016.

we have advanced a theory to account for credible powersharing in weak states in the absence of strong political institutions or external guarantors. Counter-intuitively, we argue that ethnic powersharing is a positive function of the civil war capabilities of both the ruling and rival groups—that is, their mobilizational potential to forcibly seize power when they are excluded from the central government. When mutually strong, both prefer to accept the risk of coups to the risk of civil wars and neither is willing to systematically exclude the other from government. Continuous, if fluid, powersharing emerges. Extensive quantitative and qualitative evidence supports our theoretical argument and provides novel empirical insights into the outcome of the coup-civil war trap across post-colonial Africa. Overall this paper is one of the first to offer an integrated and parsimonious theory to account for how the distribution of societal power leads to durable powersharing in weak states. In doing so, it also unpacks the strategic relationship between coups and civil war. Coups are significantly more likely from groups that can credibly demand inclusion with the threat of a strong civil war.

The paper also points to several avenues for future research. One important question is, if the exclusion-civil war equilibrium is partially determined by a country's ethnic geography, what then is the way out? Are these countries not doomed to further cycles of ethno-political exclusion and devastating civil war? This argument implies that overcoming the hurdle posed by highly uneven balances of power is paramount for

effective peacemaking and longer-term political resolution. In this, perhaps outside actors can have a role: by acting as a guarantor of status for groups that have insufficient threat capabilities of their own, international intervention may be able to reduce incentives for the sort of exclusion through coups and purges that leads to civil war.

Another related avenue of research is the interplay between societal power and political institutionalization.¹⁰⁰ To what degree has a societal balance of power helped to undergird democracy in some countries, such as Benin and Ghana? Can political institutionalization foster inter-ethnic powersharing even under conditions of unfavorable ethnic geography? The empirical results are suggestive of this possibility but much more rigorous research is warranted on this front and the antecedent question of how party rule emerges in the first place, especially in countries with strong power imbalances.

A final avenue for future investigation is to analyze how potential secession affects the strategic dynamics and increases peripheral groups' bargaining power vis-à-vis the ruling group. Throughout post-independence Africa, the regional system has strongly discouraged secession, in an attempt to reduce the risk of inter-state war. However, this has eliminated a powerful source of leverage for peripheral groups—the threat of

¹⁰⁰ Moe 2005.

exit¹⁰¹—and contributed to their political marginalization. Opening the door to secession is, of course, no panacea as it can substitute one source of instability for another—as seen between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 and 1978. How to resolve this conundrum—increasing the bargaining power of weak groups while maintaining regional stability—remains a major theoretical question and policy challenge but is critical to understanding and ending the exclusion-conflict cycle in large, weak states.

¹⁰¹ Hirschman 1970.

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SELF-ENFORCING POWERSHARING IN WEAK STATES

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1. Variable Calculation and Summary Statistics

The main explanatory variables capture the dyadic balance of threat capabilities between the ruling group and a given rival group. To construct this, we must first construct a measure of threat capabilities at the group level. We include two factors in this calculation which we believe factor into the group's ability to credibly threaten to seize power: its size as a share of the population, and the distance between the centroid of its home territory and the state capital.

For group population size as a proportion of the country's total population, we draw the data from the EPR 2014 dataset. The power of population is inherently relative: a set number of people represents a larger share of the population in a smaller state than in a larger state, and therefore represents more real power in that smaller state. This results in a variable that can theoretically range from very nearly 0 (the group has only a tiny proportion of the state's population) to 1 (the group makes up the entire state population).

The power of proximity is not relative in the same way: the challenges of mobilizing forces and transporting supplies in order to project power over a certain distance are relatively constant across countries and across groups within countries. That is, it varies at a constant rate depending on the distance, whether that distance represents the entirety of the state or just a small region. Thus, to create this measure, we begin with each group's capital city distance—the distance from its centroid (the mathematical average of all points' latitude and longitude) to the country's capital city (drawn from EPR 2014). We then standardize this capital city distance from 0 to 1 for all groups in the sample, using the group with the shortest capital city distance (the Americo-Liberians in Liberia whose homeland is calculated as only 15 kilometers

from Monrovia, the capital) and the longest capital city distance (the Makonde-Yao of Mozambique whose homeland is in the northeast of the country and some 1800 kilometers from Maputo, the capital) as reference points. This results in a variable that can range from 0 (the centroid as near to the capital as possible) to 1 (the centroid is as far from the capital as possible). Since proximity is more, not less, threatening, we then subtract this value from 1 to reverse the scale such that higher values represent greater threat capabilities.

Because we have no theoretical reason to expect either of these variables to be more important than the other, we weight them equally in calculating overall threat capabilities. This measure is gathered by taking the arithmetic mean of the threat-by-size value and the threat-by-proximity value, resulting in a variable on the interval from close to 0 to close to 1.

Summary statistics for this variable and its component parts are presented in Table A.1.1.

Table A.1.1 Summary Statistics (Threat Capabilities)

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	St. Dev
<i>scaled size</i>	0	0.98	0.09	0.16	0.19
<i>scaled size—ruling</i>	0.01	0.98	0.18	0.26	0.22
<i>scaled (reverse) distance</i>	0	1	0.83	0.79	0.18
<i>scaled (reverse) distance—ruling</i>	0.22	1	0.85	0.82	0.17
<i>threat capabilities</i>	0.03	0.96	0.48	0.47	0.16
<i>threat capabilities—ruling</i>	0.12	0.96	0.55	0.54	0.16

These capabilities measures are then used to construct the dyadic threat capabilities balance variables that serve as the main explanatory variables. If both the ruling and other group in a dyad are above the median, the dyad is coded HH (high-high); if the ruling group is above the median while the other group is below, the dyad is coded HL (high-low); if the ruling group is below the median while the other group is above, the dyad is coded LH (low-high); and if both

are below the median the dyad is coded LL (low-low). Frequencies of each of these categories are presented in Table A.1.2.

Table A.1.2: Summary Statistics (Explanatory Variables)

Variable	Min	Max	Frequency
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0	1	0.357
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>	0	1	0.416
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>	0	1	0.083
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>	0	1	0.144

Descriptive summary statistics for the main outcome variables (interethnic powersharing, successful coups, and civil war onset) are presented in Table A.1.3, and summaries of the control variables are presented in Table A.1.4.

Table A.1.3: Summary Statistics (Outcome Variables)

Variable	Min	Max	Frequency
<i>interethnic powersharing</i>	0	1	0.467
<i>successful coup</i>	0	1	0.005
<i>civil war onset</i>	0	1	0.009

Table A.1.4: Summary Statistics (Control Variables)

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	St. Dev
<i>log GDP per capita</i>	4.96	9.77	7.46	7.57	0.85
<i>log country population</i>	12.53	18.94	16.06	15.89	1.31
<i>number of ethnic groups</i>	0	13	5	5.23	3.08
<i>institutionalized regime</i>	0	1		0.73	0.44
<i>former French colony</i>	0	1		0.29	0.45
<i>Cold War</i>	0	1		0.46	0.50
<i>pastcoup</i>	0	1		0.13	0.33
<i>pastconflict</i>	0	1		0.13	0.33
<i>ongoing rebellion</i>	0	1		0.21	0.40
<i>year</i>	1946	2013	1987	1986.52	16.46

2. Ethnic Geography and the Construction of Ethnicity

The statistical tests in the paper provide strong support for the threat capabilities theory of powersharing. Employing a parsimonious measure of the distribution of societal power based on a group's size and geographic distance to the capital city, we are able to account for the durability of powersharing and a ruler's willingness to accept coup risk versus civil war risk. But relying on ethnic geography as a measure of threat capabilities is not without limitations.

Ethnicity's constructivist foundations, which accept that ethnic boundaries (and groups) are not fixed and that individuals possess multiple identities whose salience is situational,¹⁰² pose two potential challenges to the credibility of the empirical results. First, identifying a stable and objective set of politically-relevant ethnic groups is difficult, as a number of different ethnic and ethno-regional cleavages in a country could be seen as salient and lead to competing units of analysis.¹⁰³ For example, in Uganda one could categorize Northerners as a single ethno-regional grouping or disaggregate the region into distinct ethnic groups (e.g., Acholi, Alur, Kakwa, Lango, Lugbara, Madi and Teso). Which coding one chooses has material consequences on the groups included in the sample and the threat capabilities scores assigned to those groups. Second, competition for state power and the coups and civil war that arise from this could shape the existence and intensity of a country's ethnic divisions, making identifiably different ethnic groups endogenous to political structures and events.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Chandra 2012.

¹⁰³ Fearon 2003.

¹⁰⁴ Fearon 2000; Eifert et al. 2010.

To address both of these concerns and mitigate the problems that may arise from ethnicity's endogeneity to post-colonial politics, we check the sensitivity of the findings to alternative means of selecting relevant ethnic groups and their boundaries. The results are highly robust to both alternative statistical analyses.

2.1 Using Data from Fearon (2003) and Ethnologue as an Alternative Measure of Ethnic Geography

For an alternate set of ethnic units of analysis, we re-run the analysis using data from Fearon's (2003) dataset of ethnic and cultural diversity across the globe, which provides information on the relative size of all ethnic groups that make up at least 1 percent of the population in 160 countries. While this dataset provides an alternative list of relevant ethnic configurations in sub-Saharan Africa, it does not provide any data on the geographic location of the ethnic groups or their relative access to state power. For the latter—a group's representation in the central government—we carefully match one-by-one the ethnic groups in the EPR 3.0 dataset¹⁰⁵ with the list of ethnic groups in Fearon's dataset to identify whether the groups corresponded to each other as exact matches, partial matches (in which the Fearon group was a subset of the EPR group or vice versa), or no match. Groups we could not match were dropped from the analysis.

¹⁰⁵ We matched this data with EPR 3.0. Available at <http://www.epr.ucla.edu/> Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009.

Of the 35 countries covered in both datasets,¹⁰⁶ EPR 3.0 identifies 217 ethnic groups and Fearon identifies 292 ethnic groups. The key difference in the datasets is the level of aggregation they choose to demarcate ethnic group boundaries; EPR tends to identify the relevant boundaries at a higher level of aggregation than Fearon. In the case of Northern Uganda mentioned previously, EPR codes the relevant social boundary as Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur) whereas Fearon's dataset includes each of these sub-groups as individual units.¹⁰⁷

We were able to match 237 ethnic groups from Fearon's dataset as corresponding to a similar ethnic configuration in the EPR dataset.¹⁰⁸ Of these, 135 groups, or 57%, represent perfect matches with EPR groups and the rest represent partial matches, in which the Fearon groups are nested in a broader EPR group or vice versa. The high degree of consistency between the two independent attempts to systematically identify relevant ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa represents a nice validity check of the EPR dataset, which is widely used in the study of ethnic politics.

To calculate a group's threat capabilities using Fearon's groups as the unit of analysis, we need additional information on the group's location (Fearon does report the relative group size,

¹⁰⁶ The following sub-Saharan African countries are excluded from the data analysis: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Tanzania because the countries do not meet the size criteria (a population of at least 1 million and a surface area of at least 500,000 square kilometers as of 2005), ethnicity is considered to be of low salience, or a newly independent country.

¹⁰⁷ Though the EPR, taking into account identity changes, recategorizes the relevant ethnic groups over time as region becomes less salient and ethnic identities more so.

¹⁰⁸ Most of the 55 ethnic groups in Fearon that are un-matched with groups in EPR are due to EPR considering these groups as politically-irrelevant. There were 12 EPR groups that we could not match to Fearon's dataset. Overall of the matched groups, there were 237 Fearon groups to 205 EPR groups.

the other component of threat capabilities). For the perfectly matched groups, we calculate this data from the polygons created by the GeoEPR-ETH dataset. For partially matched groups (which often represent subset of larger EPR groups), however, we need additional information on each ethnic group's homeland or geographic area. To identify these areas, we rely on maps from Ethnologue, which reports spatial concentrations of ethnic groups in many African countries.¹⁰⁹ With the size and distance data, we then recalculated the balance of threat capabilities for the ruling group and a given opposition group and place each group in the relevant dyad. The categories break down as follows:

- *High-high (HH) threat capabilities: N=2,206 group-years (31%)*
- *High-low (HL) threat capabilities: N=1,850 group-years (26%)*
- *Low-high (LH) threat capabilities: N=1,202 group-years (17%)*
- *Low-low (LL) threat capabilities: N=1,800 group-years (26%)*

Using Fearon's data on ethnic groups leads to a different distribution of dyadic configurations, most notably a higher number of LH and LL dyads (a result of its tendency to rely on lower levels of group aggregation). To identify powersharing, coups, and group rebellion, we rely on the same data sources as above, and conduct additional research when necessary to identify whether a given subgroup was a participant in a coup or rebellion.

Table A.2.1 reports re-estimated logistic regression models with all controls (models EP-5 and EP-6, SC-5 and SC-6, and CW-5 and CW-6 from Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively) using the dyads defined by Fearon's groups as the unit of analysis. Results are very similar to those using the EPR 2014 ethnic group configurations, with the additional finding that LH dyads reach significance in powersharing and civil war models. Ruling groups are significantly more likely to

¹⁰⁹ Available at <http://www.ethnologue.com/>.

include a given rival into their central government when both possess strong threat capabilities, significantly reducing civil war risk but increasing coup risk.

Table A.2.1: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War using Ethnic Configurations from Fearon (2003)

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.70*** (0.22)		0.52** (0.22)		-1.32*** (0.38)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.49** (0.24)		-0.89** (0.38)		1.16*** (0.35)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-1.06*** (0.34)		-0.28 (0.33)		1.73*** (0.54)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.82** (0.37)		-0.32 (0.44)		1.12* (0.60)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.26* (0.14)	0.29** (0.14)	-0.66* (0.38)	-0.70* (0.36)	-0.53** (0.25)	-0.53** (0.25)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.26** (0.13)	0.28** (0.14)	-0.22 (0.24)	-0.24 (0.22)	-0.17 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.20)
<i>Ethnic fractionalization</i>	0.40 (1.01)	0.60 (0.94)	-0.57 (0.80)	-0.75 (0.85)	-2.32** (1.05)	-2.26** (0.92)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.40 (0.26)	0.38 (0.26)	0.73 (0.47)	0.75* (0.45)	-0.05 (0.33)	-0.05 (0.29)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.60 (0.37)	0.64 (0.37)	0.27 (0.32)	0.27 (0.32)	-0.94* (0.56)	-0.99* (0.57)
<i>Pastcoup</i>			2.01*** (0.44)	1.92*** (0.46)		
<i>Pastconflict</i>					0.45 (0.36)	0.26 (0.36)
<i>Cold War</i>	0.59 (0.58)	0.61 (0.58)	0.56 (0.89)	0.57 (0.88)	1.25* (0.75)	1.19 (0.73)
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					-0.33 (0.84)	-0.33 (0.88)
<i>Year</i>	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
<i>t</i>	-1.78*** (0.19)	-1.77*** (0.19)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.16)
<i>t²</i>	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-73.03 (38.70)	-72.10 (38.62)	90.33 (51.68)	93.79 (52.77)	-61.30 (57.88)	-69.06 (61.91)
N	6487	6487	6391	6391	6391	6391
states	34	34	34	34	34	34
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.07

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in Table 1 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Fearon's data of ethnic and cultural diversity is used to identify relevant ethnic groups for analysis. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***, $p < 0.01$, **, $p < 0.05$, and *, $p < 0.10$

2.2 Restricting the Analysis to Group Configurations at Independence

The second potential concern is that the results suffer from endogeneity bias as competition for state power leads to changes in ethnic geography consistent with the purported hypotheses. Although plausible, this critique encounters significant theoretical and empirical limitations. Theoretically, while the effect of civil war on ethnic divisions is well discussed in the literature, there is almost no research suggesting endogenous construction of large identity groups from coups. Why these forms of violent conflict would have opposite effects on the construction of identity is not obvious.

Similarly, there are contradicting theories of whether access to power and the rents that come from power should lead to group enlargement¹¹⁰ or group narrowing.¹¹¹ According to the EPR dataset, the active cases of fractionalization in post-colonial Africa are consistent with the latter group-narrowing hypothesis, which biases the results against us. The EPR 2014 dataset codes 18 instances of larger ethnic coalitions splitting into smaller ethnic divisions (with 52 resulting groups), of which 94% (all but one) occurred when the group was in, or coming into, power. Ethnic recombination is less common, with only 5 incidents (from 11 original groups).

Nonetheless, to limit the potential bias that may arise as ethnic configurations change during the post-colonial period, we re-run the analysis only with the ethnic configurations as they exist at independence, which reduces the total observations by about seven percent. By

¹¹⁰ Posner 2005.

¹¹¹ Bates 1983; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Caselli and Coleman 2013.

only including groups as they exist at independence, it will exclude any incidences of fractionalization and amalgamation as a result of post-colonial politics.

The results, using EPR 2014 and replicating the main models in the paper, are reported in Table A.2.2. The findings are nearly identical, especially for the effect on powersharing and coup risk, increasing our confidence that the empirics are not merely driven by post-colonial changes in ethnic geography.

Table A.2.2: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War with Independence Group Configurations

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.63*** (0.24)		1.43** (0.65)		-0.54 (0.41)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.68** (0.28)		-3.09** (1.20)		0.40 (0.47)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		0.05 (0.35)		-0.55 (0.69)		0.89* (0.53)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.05*** (0.37)		-0.78 (0.66)		0.63 (0.53)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.31** (0.15)	0.30** (0.14)	-0.37 (0.35)	-0.49 (0.36)	-0.44* (0.23)	-0.46** (0.22)
<i>Log country population</i>	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.24 (0.18)	0.22 (0.23)	0.22 (0.22)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.84*** (0.29)	0.78*** (0.30)	0.73* (0.44)	0.71* (0.41)	-0.18 (0.48)	-0.17 (0.46)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.49 (0.36)	0.41 (0.35)	0.23 (0.38)	0.19 (0.38)	0.10 (0.65)	0.07 (0.68)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.65 (0.41)	-0.63 (0.42)	-0.03 (0.86)	-0.03 (0.88)	-1.10 (0.87)	-1.10 (0.85)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.92*** (0.46)	1.69*** (0.50)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.13 (0.70)	0.12 (0.70)
<i>Past conflict</i>					0.31 (0.59)	0.29 (0.58)
<i>t</i>	-1.80*** (0.16)	-1.79*** (0.16)	-0.19* (0.11)	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.11)
<i>t²</i>	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.01)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
constant	-101.88 (25.40)	-103.39 (26.41)	139.09 (62.47)	134.57 (62.85)	-60.42 (55.49)	-60.65 (57.18)
N	6313	6313	6318	6318	6323	6323
states	38	38	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.79	0.14	0.16	0.05	0.05

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Only ethnic groups which existed at the time of independence are included in the analysis. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3. Validations and Sensitivity Analysis

Measuring inherently abstract concepts such as threat capabilities, and specifying models across broad cross-sectional time-series data, requires certain estimation choices. It is important to validate the results through sensitivity analysis showing whether, and when, these choices influence the patterns observed. In the discussion below, we present the results of a wide variety of alternative choices for variable operationalization, case identification criteria, and model specification. These models demonstrate that the main results are highly robust, and not unduly influenced by minor details of the empirical strategy.

3.1 Alternative Measures of Threat Capabilities

Central to the paper's theoretical argument is that it is the balance of threat capabilities between the ruling group and a given rival group that ultimately shapes political bargaining outcomes in weak states. To explore these effects, we construct a measure of threat capabilities of individual groups based on their size and distance from the capital. To code the balance of threat capabilities for any given non-ruling group relative to the current ruling group, we construct four dummy variables that measure whether the ruling group's and the rival group's threat capabilities are below or above the median of threat capabilities for all groups in post-colonial Africa.

In this section we test four adjusted measures of balance of threat capabilities. The first reports results in which threat capabilities are calculated using a given EPR group's minimum distance to the capital city rather than the centroid point of the group. The second reports results in which size and distance factors are combined into a single measure of threat

capabilities by taking their geometric mean, rather than their arithmetic mean. The third relaxes our dyadic framework (modeling each ruling group versus a given rival group) and instead takes into account coalitional politics (e.g., alliances between included groups). The fourth measures threat capabilities specific to each country.

3.1.1 Full Regression Models Using Minimum EPR Group Distance to Capital to Calculate Threat Capabilities

Measuring the effective distance between a given ethnic group and the capital requires identifying a specific location for that ethnic group. For the main results, we do this by calculating the centroid of the ethnic group's territorial polygon—that is, the mathematical average in two dimensions of latitude and longitude. This midpoint of the area covered by a group provides a sort of average of how far away its members are from the capital. However, it may be the case that proximity of any area under territorial control provides a sort of launching-off point to challenge the capital, and thus the nearest point of the ethnic group's territory, not the average position, is more relevant. As a check on the results, we re-calculate the threat capabilities variable substituting the ICRGrid-cell closest to the capital that intersects with the group polygon as their location. As shown in Table A.3.1.1, this does not generally change the direction or significance of the results.

Table A.3.1.1: Threat Capabilities Measured Using Minimum Group Distance and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities-min</i>	0.59** (0.25)		1.01* (0.55)		-0.33 (0.28)	
<i>HL threat capabilities-min</i>		-0.65** (0.27)		-1.80** (0.70)		0.18 (0.37)
<i>LH threat capabilities-min</i>		0.01 (0.37)		-0.34 (0.67)		0.18 (0.53)
<i>LL threat capabilities-min</i>		-0.99*** (0.34)		-0.59 (0.60)		0.88** (0.38)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.33** (0.14)	0.30** (0.15)	-0.15 (0.37)	-0.23 (0.39)	-0.80*** (0.22)	-0.77*** (0.23)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.18)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.15)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.17** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.09)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.80*** (0.27)	0.75*** (0.28)	0.69* (0.42)	0.73* (0.41)	-0.33 (0.46)	-0.26 (0.41)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.44 (0.36)	0.38 (0.36)	0.06 (0.38)	-0.08 (0.40)	0.07 (0.55)	0.05 (0.52)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.63* (0.36)	-0.62* (0.37)	0.06 (0.86)	0.07 (0.87)	-0.95 (0.84)	-0.91 (0.87)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.40*** (0.47)	1.24** (0.50)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.38 (0.77)	0.42 (0.74)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.46 (0.63)	-0.46 (0.62)
<i>t</i>	-1.87*** (0.14)	-1.85*** (0.14)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.24*** (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-97.71 (22.59)	-98.17 (23.73)	93.64 (55.72)	96.38 (55.90)	-94.80 (57.35)	-83.07 (60.35)
N	6670	6670	6674	6674	6681	6681
states	37	37	37	37	37	37
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.13	0.13	0.05	0.06

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. These measures use the minimum distance between a group's homeland and the capital, rather than the centroid distance, in the construction of this variable. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.1.2 Testing the Effect of the Balance of Threat Capabilities Using Geometric Mean of Size and Distance

Combining two attributes creating societal power—each groups’ size as a share of the population and its relative proximity to the capital city—requires choices about how to factor each component into calculations of a single threat capabilities measure. Because we have no prior reason to believe one is more important than the other, we treat them equally by scaling both to the [0,1] interval (with similar standard deviations), where 0 represents the minimum possible strength and 1 the maximum. In the main analysis, we then combine them by calculating the arithmetic mean: adding the two values and dividing the resulting sum by two.

An alternative approach would be to combine these scaled variables using their geometric mean: multiplying the two values and taking the square root of the resulting product. This would capture an interaction of the two factors—even a large group is non-threatening if it is extremely far away, and even a close group is non-threatening if it is extremely small. To check whether the effect of threat capabilities on powersharing is robust to such an alternative construction, we recalculate the main models using threat category codings based on the geometric mean.¹¹² As shown in Table A.3.1.2, this does not substantially change the results.

¹¹² This measure (intentionally places more weight on the smaller value—combining a 0.1 and a 0.9 will result in a smaller score than combining a 0.5 and a 0.5. Since the mean of scaled group size (0.17) is substantially smaller than the mean of scaled (and reversed) group distance (0.74), the resulting measure is more heavily influenced by, and much more strongly correlated with, values of group size.

Table A.3.1.2: Threat Capabilities Measured Using Geometric Mean and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities-geo</i>	0.74*** (0.19)		1.25** (0.59)		-0.74** (0.37)	
<i>HL threat capabilities-geo</i>		-0.75*** (0.20)		-2.20*** (0.85)		0.35 (0.45)
<i>LH threat capabilities-geo</i>		-0.45 (0.33)		-0.42 (0.91)		1.43** (0.58)
<i>LL threat capabilities-geo</i>		-0.89*** (0.31)		-0.75 (0.71)		1.21** (0.51)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.21 (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)	-0.39 (0.34)	-0.42 (0.33)	-0.63*** (0.21)	-0.61*** (0.18)
<i>Log country population</i>	-0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.26 (0.18)	-0.22 (0.20)	0.11 (0.15)	0.13 (0.14)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.17* (0.09)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.11)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.77*** (0.27)	0.76*** (0.28)	0.73 (0.47)	0.71* (0.41)	-0.23 (0.46)	-0.09 (0.42)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.40 (0.31)	0.41 (0.31)	-0.18 (0.46)	-0.05 (0.48)	0.16 (0.57)	0.29 (0.48)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.46 (0.36)	-0.47 (0.37)	0.00 (0.86)	0.02 (0.86)	-0.98 (0.82)	-0.95 (0.84)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.67*** (0.61)	1.39* (0.71)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.32 (0.72)	0.27 (0.63)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.35 (0.64)	-0.44 (0.66)
<i>t</i>	-1.85*** (0.13)	-1.84*** (0.13)	-0.20** (0.10)	-0.23** (0.11)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-88.61 (24.49)	-88.71 (24.78)	113.38 (71.01)	103.10 (67.83)	-80.86 (53.76)	-72.32 (54.64)
N	7127	7127	7137	7137	7144	7144
states	38	38	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.13	0.14	0.05	0.07

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Size and distance are combined into threat capabilities using their geometric mean, rather than their arithmetic mean. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.1.3 Testing the Effect of Coalition Capabilities on Powersharing

In the paper we assess relative capabilities in the context of a strategic environment in which each ethnic group vying for power does so independently of each other. The single ruling group which is most politically powerful and nearly always controls the executive represents the power base that must be challenged for an alternative group (either within or outside the government) to seize control. The relevant balance of capabilities is thus between this ruling group and others. Other groups which are included in the governing coalition in a secondary role are not treated as automatic allies of the ruling group. Given the challenges to cross-cutting mobilization, the difficulty ensuring loyalty between multiple leaders sitting atop distinct power bases, and the fact that coalitions—even (or especially) those which successfully rise to power (see section 2.2 above) —frequently splinter, this assumption is theoretically and empirically defensible. Nonetheless, it is the case (and, indeed, is the focus of our paper) that interethnic power sharing does occur. Plausibly, then, the appropriate understanding of the strategic circumstances would consider the entire ruling coalition, not just the specific group whose representative holds executive office, as the entity in power. To account for this, we re-calculate our dyadic threat capabilities aggregating all of those groups included in the government on the ruling side. With respect to potential challenger groups *excluded* from the government, the ruling ‘group’ then includes this full aggregation. With respect to potential challenger groups *included* in the government, the ruling ‘group’ aggregates only all other groups in power (since presumably an attempt to seize control would take its own power base on the side of the challenger). Table A.3.1.3 reports the results of these analyses using the aggregated coalition measure in the construction of the threat capability dyad variables, showing that the direction

and significance of variables of interest are not affected in any meaningful way by this alternative coding choice. The only differences of note are that the coefficient for LL groups in powersharing models is no longer significant, while the coefficient for LH groups is significant. It is not surprising that these terms might shift slightly given what this alternative measure represents; when aggregating all groups within the ruling coalition, it is relatively infrequent for a state to have a low threat capability ruler (8.6% and 4.9% of the sample in LH and LL, respectively).

Table A.3.1.3: Coalition Measure of Ruling Group Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities-coalit</i>	0.79*** (0.21)		1.27* (0.77)		-0.86** (0.37)	
<i>HL threat capabilities-coalit</i>		-0.85*** (0.23)		-2.44*** (0.94)		0.65 (0.40)
<i>LH threat capabilities-coalit</i>		-1.14* (0.62)		0.76 (1.23)		2.16*** (0.57)
<i>LL threat capabilities-coalit</i>		0.14 (0.63)		0.87 (1.09)		1.12* (0.63)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.22 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	-0.41 (0.35)	-0.67 (0.42)	-0.63*** (0.20)	-0.69*** (0.17)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.21 (0.20)	-0.30 (0.22)	0.05 (0.17)	0.11 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.77*** (0.27)	0.85*** (0.26)	0.70 (0.45)	0.86 (0.53)	-0.23 (0.45)	-0.02 (0.42)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.55* (0.32)	0.58* (0.33)	0.03 (0.40)	0.20 (0.43)	0.06 (0.56)	0.23 (0.55)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.49 (0.37)	-0.45 (0.38)	-0.01 (0.82)	0.00 (0.82)	-0.94 (0.82)	-0.81 (0.77)
<i>Year</i>	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.45*** (0.50)	1.41*** (0.47)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.37 (0.73)	0.38 (0.74)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.34 (0.63)	-0.32 (0.64)
<i>t</i>	-1.84*** (0.14)	-1.83*** (0.14)	-0.24*** (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-85.77 (25.18)	-84.54 (25.31)	99.69 (59.13)	99.17 (52.70)	-81.05 (51.87)	-74.34 (47.38)
N	7142	7142	7152	7152	7159	7159
states	38	38	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.13	0.16	0.06	0.07

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Ruling group capabilities are considered as the aggregate of all groups in the governing coalition, rather than simply the group holding the executive office. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.1.4 Testing the Effect of Country-Relative Threat Capabilities on Powersharing

Our analysis operationalizes threat capabilities based on a group's size and distance from the capital city, which are scaled and combined into a single threat measure. Size is scaled as a proportion of that country's population. The ability of a certain number of people to challenge for control inherently depends on the number of people with whom they would be fighting. Distance, however, is scaled relative to the continent as a whole, rather than the country itself. The challenges of power projection—moving and supplying forces and equipment across space—are more directly related to the actual distance traveled, regardless of whether that distance represents the entirety of the country or just a small portion. The combined measure of threat capabilities for each group-year that results is then classified as above or below the overall median of this variable in the data, which allows for the possibility that states may have many high threat capability groups (and thus be more likely to feature interethnic powersharing and/or coups) or very few high threat capability groups (and thus be more prone to civil war).

An alternative approach would scale both threat components relative to the given country, and to define high and low threat capabilities relative to the median of the given country. Although this is less consistent with our theoretical mechanism (and does not allow for countries to have mostly-high or mostly-low threat capability groups), there is nonetheless some merit to this approach, given the relative nature of power. Table A.3.1.4 shows models estimated using this alternative measurement. The empirical results are slightly weaker, but still tell essentially the same story—all coefficients retain the same sign, and statistical significance is retained in most cases.

Table A.3.1.4: Country-Relative Measure of Group Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities-relat</i>	0.34* (0.19)		0.66* (0.38)		-0.68** (0.32)	
<i>HL threat capabilities-relat</i>		-0.32 (0.23)		-0.80** (0.39)		0.44 (0.39)
<i>LH threat capabilities-relat</i>		-0.06 (0.29)		-0.65 (0.59)		0.86* (0.44)
<i>LL threat capabilities-relat</i>		-0.71** (0.34)		-0.19 (0.78)		1.21*** (0.34)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.32** (0.14)	0.28* (0.15)	-0.19 (0.35)	-0.22 (0.39)	-0.66*** (0.25)	-0.64*** (0.24)
<i>Log country population</i>	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.18)	0.22 (0.19)	0.17 (0.20)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.09)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.81*** (0.29)	0.76** (0.30)	0.59 (0.46)	0.60 (0.45)	0.10 (0.40)	0.16 (0.36)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.45 (0.38)	0.42 (0.37)	-0.03 (0.42)	-0.04 (0.42)	0.33 (0.62)	0.28 (0.63)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.59* (0.35)	-0.61* (0.37)	0.13 (0.84)	0.14 (0.84)	-1.22 (0.88)	-1.18 (0.91)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.57*** (0.46)	1.54*** (0.53)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.58 (0.78)	0.59 (0.74)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.82 (0.60)	-0.80 (0.58)
<i>t</i>	-1.87*** (0.15)	-1.85*** (0.15)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.12)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-93.91 (21.69)	-95.81 (22.65)	99.66 (55.00)	99.45 (55.00)	-102.10 (60.24)	-93.58 (60.87)
N	6843	6843	6847	6847	6854	6854
states	35	35	35	35	35	35
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.12	0.12	0.05	0.06

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the state in question—rather than the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.2 Alternative Classification of Rebellion

In the paper, we analyze the effect of threat capabilities on civil war onset, expecting that strong rivals will be significantly less likely to engage in large-scale political violence. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with this expectation. In this section we re-run the models with alternative codings of the rebellion dependent variable, using both measures of large-scale rebellion¹¹³ and smaller-scale rebellion from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset¹¹⁴ and varying the use of either onset or incidence (coded 1 for every year the group is engaged in large-scale rebellion). The results using smaller-scale rebellion, reported in table A.3.2.1, are generally similar to those in the main analysis but with more conflicts in HL dyads. The results using the incidence dependent variable, reported in table A.3.2.2, are substantially weaker than the onset models. Interestingly in the LL dyads the sign is now negative, perhaps suggesting that while LL dyads are more likely experience civil war (see Table 3 in main paper) these are unlikely to be long wars.

¹¹³ Roessler 2011 updated through 2013.

¹¹⁴ Vogt 2015; Gleditsch et al. 2002.

Table A.3.2.1: Balance of Threat Capabilities and Low-Level Rebellion by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa

	Rebellion Onset	
	1	2
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	-0.54* (0.29)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		0.58* (0.32)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		0.84* (0.43)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		0.23 (0.32)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	-0.35** (0.17)	-0.36** (0.17)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.25 (0.16)	0.28 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.22 (0.56)	0.20 (0.56)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.23 (0.36)	0.21 (0.35)
<i>Cold War</i>	0.25 (0.74)	0.27 (0.74)
<i>Year</i>	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>	0.56 (0.44)	0.57 (0.43)
<i>Past conflict</i>	0.51 (0.43)	0.52 (0.43)
<i>t</i>	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.16** (0.06)
<i>t²</i>	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
constant	7.53 (33.68)	7.54 (32.88)
N	7145	7145
states	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.06	0.07

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting civil war onset (Models 1 and 2, following CW-5 and CW-6 in main paper). Coding of the dependent variable is adapted to generate a larger set of (smaller scale) rebellions. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

Table A.3.2.2: Balance of Threat Capabilities and Rebellion Incidence by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Large-Scale		Low-Level	
	Rebellion Incidence		Rebellion Incidence	
	1	2	3	4
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	-0.17 (0.28)		-0.12 (0.23)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		0.47 (0.32)		0.21 (0.24)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		0.49 (0.45)		0.67* (0.36)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.48* (0.26)		-0.52* (0.28)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.16)	-0.47** (0.22)	-0.53** (0.20)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.14 (0.12)	0.25** (0.11)	0.29* (0.17)	0.36** (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	-0.36 (0.31)	-0.30 (0.31)	-0.31 (0.28)	-0.25 (0.28)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.01 (0.23)	0.13 (0.27)	-0.19 (0.24)	-0.19 (0.22)
<i>Cold War</i>	-1.13*** (0.33)	-1.02*** (0.30)	-0.86** (0.36)	-0.75* (0.38)
<i>Year</i>	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>	1.65*** (0.26)	1.66*** (0.30)	0.82*** (0.26)	0.85*** (0.28)
<i>Past conflict</i>	1.24*** (0.39)	1.31*** (0.38)	0.64*** (0.21)	0.73*** (0.22)
<i>t</i>	-1.10*** (0.12)	-1.06*** (0.12)	-0.98*** (0.08)	-0.95*** (0.09)
<i>t²</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-58.17 (38.52)	-55.48 (30.71)	-66.57 (19.50)	-59.29 (20.26)
N	7145	7145	7145	7145
states	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.70	0.71	0.58	0.59

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting civil war (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6 in main paper), using any civil war incidence rather than only civil war onset, for both large scale (Models 1 and 2) and small scale (Models 3 and 4) rebellion. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.3 Alternative Classification of Coups

The main analysis of coup outcomes includes only successful coups—those which resulted in the removal of the executive from power. This ensures that models are including only credible challenges to seize authority. However, the theoretical logic does not necessarily require this restriction—even failed coups may be the result of the strategic processes identified. Table A.3.3 below presents estimated models using total coup attempts (successful or unsuccessful) as the outcome of interest, and shows that the substantive and statistical results are not greatly influenced by this specification choice.

Table A.3.3: Total Coups by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Total Coups	
	1	2
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.74** (0.31)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-1.22*** (0.43)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.38 (0.42)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.54 (0.47)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	-0.37 (0.23)	-0.42* (0.24)
<i>Log country population</i>	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.15)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	-0.37 (0.23)	-0.34 (0.22)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.55* (0.28)	0.53* (0.29)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.39 (0.46)	-0.37 (0.47)
<i>Year</i>	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
<i>Past coup</i>	1.14*** (0.39)	1.08*** (0.37)
<i>t</i>	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.21** (0.08)
<i>t²</i>	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
constant	1.27 (29.54)	6.43 (28.18)
N	7137	7137
states	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.14	0.14

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting coups (Models 1 and 2, following SC-5 and SC-6 in main paper). Coding of the dependent variable is adjusted to include all coup attempts, successful or otherwise. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.4 Models with Additional Control Variables

Finally, we assess the robustness of the empirical results by estimating models with additional, or alternative, control variables.

3.4.1 Controlling for Extant Levels of Powesharing on Ethno-Political Bargaining (Cross-Group Analysis)

Interactions between ruling groups and other groups do not occur in a vacuum—each dyadic relationship may be influenced by other relationships in the same state-year. The nature of this influence is not theoretically clear: inclusion of one group may increase the likelihood others' inclusion as the benefits of peace are expanded, it may decrease the likelihood of others' inclusion as the increasingly strong coalition has less need for further allies, or it may have no effect on the likelihood of others' inclusion beyond the underlying exogenous propensity of a particular ruling group to seek out governing partners. To explore this, we generate variables measuring whether and how much powersharing is occurring in a given year—a binary indicator of whether there were any groups beyond the executive included in the ruling coalition and a count of the number of groups in the ruling coalition. The results of powersharing models including this control variable are presented in Table A.3.4.1. The threat capability variables of interest remain strongly and consistently statistically significant in the expected direction.

Table A.3.4.1: Controlling for Extant Levels of Ethnic Powersharing on and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing			
	1	2	3	4
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.69*** (0.20)		0.63*** (0.23)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.67*** (0.21)		-0.47* (0.27)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.23 (0.36)		-0.23 (0.37)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.18*** (0.36)		-1.35*** (0.33)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.14)	0.12 (0.17)	0.12 (0.17)
<i>Log country population</i>	-0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.49* (0.26)	0.40 (0.27)	0.58** (0.24)	0.44* (0.25)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.62** (0.25)	0.60** (0.24)	0.48 (0.34)	0.47 (0.32)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.92** (0.38)	-0.94** (0.38)	-0.64 (0.41)	-0.61 (0.43)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
<i>Non-ruling groups in power (count)</i>	0.41*** (0.10)	0.42*** (0.10)		
<i>Non-ruling groups in power (yes/no)</i>			2.01*** (0.40)	2.19*** (0.40)
<i>t</i>	-1.95*** (0.15)	-1.93*** (0.15)	-1.90*** (0.14)	-1.88*** (0.14)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-94.06 (26.40)	-96.56 (26.66)	-96.76 (26.64)	-83.13 (28.35)
N	7072	7072	7072	7072
states	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.81

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting ethnic powersharing (following EP-5 and EP-6 in Table 1 in main paper), including the count of non-ruling groups in the governing coalition (Models 1 and 2) or simply the existence of any non-ruling groups in the governing coalition (Models 3 and 4) as control variables. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.4.2 Testing the Effect of Former British Colonies

In the paper we test the effect of a country being a former French colony in order to control for possible external effects on powersharing. France had a particularly interventionist post-colonial foreign policy and went to great lengths to protect favored rulers. There results show that there is no consistent or significant effect that being a former French colony had on ethnic powersharing, coups, or civil war.

In this section we control for the effect of being a former British colony. We do not necessarily expect the British legacy to work similarly to the French legacy in terms of an external guarantor for certain regimes. Instead, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman (2016) suggest that the British legacy effects on powersharing are more institutional. British policies of indirect rule empowered peripheral groups and increased their political capabilities to gain a share of the inaugural governments, resulting in path dependent effects beyond independence.¹¹⁵ Thus, in British colonies this institutional legacy may mitigate differentials in societal power and facilitate powersharing with groups with low threat capabilities. Table A.3.4.2 reports our baseline models for powersharing, coups, and group rebellion, but controlling for former British colonies instead of former French colonies. Incorporating a former British colony variable in the models has no effect on the statistical significance of the balance of threat capabilities variables (and does not itself show evidence of significant association with the outcomes of interest).

¹¹⁵ Wucherpfennig et al. 2015.

Table A.3.4.2: The Effect of British Institutional Legacies on the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.56** (0.22)		1.09* (0.66)		-0.69* (0.41)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.62** (0.25)		-2.23** (0.92)		0.50 (0.46)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.04 (0.37)		-0.18 (0.65)		0.99** (0.50)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.97*** (0.28)		-0.73 (0.73)		1.03* (0.53)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.21 (0.14)	0.22 (0.14)	-0.38 (0.32)	-0.49 (0.33)	-0.64*** (0.22)	-0.68*** (0.22)
<i>Log country population</i>	-0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.19)	-0.19 (0.18)	0.07 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.80*** (0.27)	0.77*** (0.28)	0.71 (0.44)	0.68 (0.43)	-0.18 (0.42)	-0.16 (0.40)
<i>Former British colony</i>	-0.21 (0.34)	-0.25 (0.35)	0.03 (0.47)	0.19 (0.47)	-0.31 (0.38)	-0.12 (0.40)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.47 (0.36)	-0.45 (0.37)	0.05 (0.86)	0.07 (0.87)	-1.00 (0.82)	-0.98 (0.81)
<i>Year</i>	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.51*** (0.49)	1.31*** (0.49)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.34 (0.70)	0.35 (0.67)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.36 (0.60)	-0.36 (0.67)
<i>t</i>	-1.87*** (0.14)	-1.85*** (0.14)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-80.07 (24.95)	-81.21 (25.15)	108.88 (59.81)	110.78 (60.17)	-84.06 (54.04)	-79.14 (56.00)
N	7127	7127	7137	7137	7144	7144
states	38	38	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.77	0.77	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.06

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). A control variable is included for being a former British colony, replacing that for former French colony. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$.

3.4.3 Testing the Effect of Having Ethnic Kin Abroad

In modeling the effect of threat capabilities on ethno-political bargaining in Africa's weak states, we focus solely on the domestic determinants of a given group's mobilizational potential. Of course, states are not self-contained units and external factors can have a strong bearing on domestic political bargaining and conflict. We include basic controls for potential external sources of powersharing, including being a former French colony and the end of the Cold War, which has led to a significant increase in negotiated political settlements and peacekeeping missions. Neither has a strong effect on the domestic determinants of powersharing. An external factor that may be more likely to have a direct bearing on inter-ethnic bargaining is whether a given group has ethnic kin abroad. Cetinyan finds that ethnic groups having powerful kin groups abroad receive better concessions from the government and are less likely to face political discrimination; he hypothesizes this is precisely due to the greater mobilizational capabilities that such groups gain from external support.¹¹⁶

Following from this we test the effect of having ethnic kin in a neighboring country. Data for this variable comes from Cederman et al., who systematically code whether a given EPR group represents a transnational ethnic group or is largely concentrated in a single state.¹¹⁷ Table A.3.4.3 reports the results of including a dummy variable for whether a given EPR group represents a transnational ethnic group. Including this variable also has no effect on the statistical or substantive significance of our measures of balance of threat capabilities. The

¹¹⁶ Cetinyan 2002.

¹¹⁷ Cederman et al. 2013.

variable itself is not a statistically significant predictor of ethnic powersharing, coups, or civil wars.

Table A.3.4.3: The Effect of Transnational Ethnic Linkages on the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.62*** (0.22)		1.14* (0.63)		-0.77** (0.38)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.66*** (0.25)		-2.27** (0.91)		0.53 (0.44)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.11 (0.35)		-0.32 (0.63)		1.07** (0.46)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.94*** (0.30)		-0.87 (0.68)		1.13** (0.51)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.22 (0.14)	0.23* (0.14)	-0.40 (0.34)	-0.50 (0.35)	-0.64*** (0.20)	-0.68*** (0.19)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.18)	0.05 (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.80*** (0.27)	0.77*** (0.28)	0.73* (0.44)	0.71* (0.42)	-0.26 (0.46)	-0.18 (0.4)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.62* (0.33)	0.58* (0.32)	0.29 (0.39)	0.21 (0.39)	-0.05 (0.54)	-0.13 (0.54)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.48 (0.37)	-0.46 (0.38)	-0.00 (0.86)	0.01 (0.88)	-0.96 (0.83)	-0.96 (0.82)
<i>Year</i>	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Transnational ethnic kin</i>	-0.09 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.21)	0.17 (0.30)	0.16 (0.29)	0.08 (0.30)	0.12 (0.28)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.53*** (0.53)	1.33** (0.53)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.35 (0.73)	0.36 (0.67)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.32 (0.61)	-0.34 (0.62)
<i>t</i>	-1.85*** (0.14)	-1.84*** (0.14)	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-83.89 (24.01)	-84.52 (24.34)	106.24 (61.91)	106.04 (60.40)	-82.21 (52.90)	-76.21 (54.76)
N	7127	7127	7137	7137	7144	7144
states	38	38	(38)	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.77	0.78	0.13	0.14	0.05	0.06

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). A control variable measuring whether the group has ethnic kin in a neighboring country is added. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.4.4 Testing the Effect of Social Distance Between Ethnic Groups

Cultural factors provide another possible cause of patterns of conflict and cooperation among ethnic groups. According to such a view, powersharing is cemented not by the balance of threat capabilities but rather by cross-cutting cultural institutions that facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation. Ruling groups may be more likely to include in government others with whom they share religious, linguistic, or racial commonalities.

To ensure that our results are robust to this potential influence, we use the EPR-Ethnic Dimensions Dataset¹¹⁸ to construct variables indicating whether or not the case group and the ruling group in a given dyad-year shared the same primary religion, primary language, or primary race. Table A.3.4.4 reports the results of models including these control variables. The importance of the core threat capabilities variables is not greatly affected—all coefficients retain the same sign and approximate magnitude, and nearly all retain statistical significance. Interestingly, there is mixed evidence of the effect of ethnic similarity itself on our outcomes of interest. None are statistically significant predictors of interethnic powersharing. All are associated with coup likelihood, but in different directions—religious ties are associated with lesser coup probability, while linguistic or racial ties are associated with greater coup probability. Only shared race has a (negative) association with the likelihood of civil war. These results are curious, and bear further examination in future research.

¹¹⁸ Bormann et al. 2015.

Table A.3.4.4: The Effect of Social Distance on the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Powersharing		Coups		Rebellion	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.53** (0.22)		1.13* (0.65)		-0.91** (0.38)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.58** (0.26)		-1.99** (0.89)		0.53 (0.46)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		0.03 (0.36)		-0.56 (0.82)		1.37*** (0.43)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.83*** (0.29)		-0.93 (0.74)		1.29*** (0.46)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.25** (0.13)	0.26** (0.13)	-0.31 (0.34)	-0.36 (0.36)	-0.67*** (0.21)	-0.77*** (0.22)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.06 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)	0.13 (0.16)	0.12 (0.18)	0.08 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.84*** (0.29)	0.82*** (0.30)	0.73 (0.49)	0.69 (0.47)	-0.13 (0.36)	-0.04 (0.32)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.66* (0.35)	0.60* (0.33)	1.07** (0.53)	0.94* (0.56)	-0.21 (0.63)	-0.35 (0.58)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.48 (0.38)	-0.46 (0.38)	-0.91 (0.66)	-0.89 (0.67)	-0.99 (0.80)	-0.96 (0.80)
<i>Year</i>	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Common primary religion</i>	-0.07 (0.29)	-0.00 (0.29)	-0.75* (0.44)	-0.64 (0.49)	0.23 (0.30)	0.25 (0.30)
<i>Common primary language</i>	1.31** (0.61)	1.31** (0.63)	1.54** (0.63)	1.43** (0.62)	0.86 (0.53)	0.80 (0.52)
<i>Common primary race</i>	0.01 (0.34)	-0.03 (0.34)	1.31*** (0.34)	1.14*** (0.38)	-0.81*** (0.29)	-1.08*** (0.33)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.10* (0.59)	0.99* (0.59)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.24 (0.77)	0.23 (0.72)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.42 (0.56)	-0.52 (0.58)
<i>t</i>	-1.90*** (0.14)	-1.89*** (0.14)	-0.21* (0.11)	-0.23* (0.12)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-81.68 (25.97)	-82.07 (26.40)	46.75 (56.81)	48.54 (55.69)	-87.19 (50.39)	-83.60 (50.74)
N	7095	7089	7099	7099	7106	7106
states	38	38	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.16	0.17	0.07	0.07

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Control variables are added indicating whether the non-ruling group shares a common primary religion, language, or race with the ruling group. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.4.5 Controlling for Determinants of State Size and Shape

One implication of our use of an absolute measure of threat capabilities is, as to be expected, the index is strongly correlated with country size. Most HH dyad-years (about 75%) are in countries below the median in terms of size. Our argument thus sheds light on the mechanisms by which Africa's large states tend to have significantly higher levels of ethnopolitical exclusion. But this correlation also points to a potential source of endogeneity—the measure is sensitive to the size and shape of Africa's states, which may otherwise influence or be influenced by political outcomes. This is not a problem if Africa's borders are arbitrary, as scholars often treat them. But in an illuminating paper, Green (2012) suggests this assumption is problematic. The size of African states is significantly correlated with pre-colonial population density and trade networks. In Green's interpretation, the European colonizers, concerned about the financial viability of prospective colonies, partitioned territory based on the density of its potential tax base and the intensity of trade networks in a given territory (the greater the intensity of trade, the less need for a larger area). Thus, it could be that the relationship between threat capabilities and powersharing is driven by these favorable demographic and trade conditions that facilitated economic development and state consolidation, underwriting inter-ethnic cooperation.

To account for this possibility, we re-estimate our main models (EP-5, EP-6, SC-5, SC-6, CW-5, CW-6) controlling for pre-colonial population density and trade (distance to coast) taken

from Green.¹¹⁹ The results reported below (see Table A.3.4.5) show that including these historical factors does not alter the results.

¹¹⁹ Green 2012.

Table A.3.4.5: Controlling for Historical Determinants of State Size and Shape

	Powersharing		Coups		Rebellion	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.60*** (0.23)		0.81 (0.62)		-0.91** (0.39)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.70*** (0.22)		-1.92** (0.94)		0.71 (0.44)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.14 (0.37)		-0.12 (0.64)		1.12** (0.50)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.93** (0.38)		-0.34 (0.73)		1.23** (0.54)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.21 (0.14)	0.22 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.40)	-0.32 (0.41)	-0.54** (0.28)	-0.57** (0.26)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.08 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.15)	0.01 (0.22)	-0.02 (0.22)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.12)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.72*** (0.27)	0.69** (0.28)	0.61 (0.46)	0.62 (0.44)	-0.14 (0.41)	-0.08 (0.36)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.59 (0.41)	0.53 (0.40)	0.48 (0.41)	0.40 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.58)	-0.07 (0.62)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.57 (0.36)	-0.54 (0.37)	0.04 (0.87)	0.07 (0.89)	-0.95 (0.81)	-0.94 (0.81)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Population density (1850)</i>	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.17 (0.23)	0.46* (0.28)	0.44* (0.26)	0.29 (0.25)	0.30 (0.27)
<i>Pre-colonial trade</i>	-0.36*** (0.13)	-0.35*** (0.13)	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.15 (0.20)	0.46 (0.36)	0.40 (0.35)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.31*** (0.46)	1.14** (0.48)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.28 (0.72)	0.30 (0.68)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.29 (0.58)	-0.32 (0.59)
<i>t</i>	-1.84*** (0.14)	-1.82*** (0.14)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)
<i>t²</i>	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-88.49 (22.10)	-88.70 (22.19)	97.42 (59.38)	96.98 (58.16)	-83.05 (56.91)	-79.04 (57.87)
N	6945	6945	6949	6949	6956	6956
states	37	37	37	37	37	37
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.14	0.15	0.06	0.06

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Control variables are added measuring pre-colonial population density and trade exposure to account for factors determining the size and shape (and thus ethnic composition) of states. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.4.6 Controlling for Determinants of Social Fractionalization

Another potential source of endogeneity may be the determinants of social fractionalization. Similar to state size and shape, threat capabilities are correlated with the level of ethnic fractionalization of a given country—the more groups, the weaker their threat capabilities. In our main models we control for the number of groups in a given country. But it could be the case that the association between the outcomes of interest and threat capabilities is endogenous to the factors that produce ethnic fractionalization—such as variation in land and elevation.¹²⁰ Rugged terrain and uneven land suitability may produce both groups with weak threat capabilities and civil wars. To control for this we re-estimate our main models including variables capturing a country's standard deviation of elevation and standard deviation of land quality taken from Michalopoulos (2012). As shown in Table A.3.4.6 the results are robust to the inclusion of these determinants as well. Quite interestingly, countries with varied terrain are significantly less likely to have coups and civil wars, whereas civil wars appear to be significantly more likely in countries with high variation in land quality and low variation of elevation. These patterns bear further analysis in future research.

¹²⁰ Michalopoulos 2012.

Table A.3.4.6: Controlling for Determinants of Social Fractionalization

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.63*** (0.21)		0.64 (0.56)		-0.83** (0.37)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.72*** (0.24)		-1.78** (0.88)		0.39 (0.49)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.06 (0.35)		0.10 (0.70)		1.33*** (0.47)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.87*** (0.30)		0.09 (0.57)		2.11*** (0.45)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.28* (0.15)	0.29* (0.15)	-0.38 (0.33)	-0.54 (0.35)	-0.64*** (0.23)	-0.79*** (0.21)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.07 (0.11)	0.10 (0.12)	0.54*** (0.19)	0.59*** (0.20)	-0.01 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.32** (0.15)	-0.29** (0.12)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.17*** (0.06)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.85*** (0.30)	0.84*** (0.31)	0.84** (0.41)	0.89** (0.41)	-0.24 (0.42)	-0.10 (0.35)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.46 (0.37)	0.40 (0.35)	-0.29 (0.40)	-0.33 (0.41)	-0.53 (0.54)	-1.14** (0.46)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.62* (0.36)	-0.61 (0.37)	-0.16 (1.01)	-0.14 (1.03)	-0.91 (0.77)	-0.84 (0.81)
<i>Year</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.04* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Variation in elevation</i>	-0.49 (0.51)	-0.49 (0.53)	-3.21*** (0.80)	-3.49*** (0.75)	-1.20** (0.55)	-2.09*** (0.52)
<i>Variation in land quality</i>	0.08 (0.20)	0.03 (0.22)	-0.81** (0.38)	-0.80** (0.36)	0.65* (0.39)	1.11*** (0.22)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.09** (0.44)	0.85* (0.45)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.24 (0.67)	0.20 (0.57)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.43 (0.57)	-0.55 (0.57)
<i>t</i>	-1.84*** (0.14)	-1.83*** (0.13)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)
<i>t²</i>	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-96.54 (22.55)	-96.86 (22.75)	108.57 (62.91)	108.86 (61.62)	-83.69 (50.37)	-66.13 (54.59)
N	6945	6945	6949	6949	6956	6956
states	37	37	37	37	37	37
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.17	0.19	0.07	0.09

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Control variables are added measuring variation in land quality and land elevation to account for factors influencing ethnic fractionalization. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.4.7 Interactions between Powersharing, Coups, and Civil War

As we argue theoretically, the outcomes of powersharing, coups, and rebellions are not independent of each other—they are different outcomes emerging from the underlying strategic processes of and choices available to groups vying for power. To explore whether this association alone is driving results, rather than the threat capabilities variables we believe to be the underlying cause of this association, we estimate additional models including lagged values of the other dependent variables—whether the previous year featured powersharing, coup, or civil war between the two groups. The results are presented in Table A.3.4.7. The findings are extremely similar to those in the main analysis—the balance of threat capabilities variables retain statistical significance, in the expected directions.

The lagged dependent variables themselves show mixed results. There is no evidence of any separate effect of prior coups or civil wars on the likelihood of powersharing. Ethnic powersharing has a statistically significant and negative association with the likelihood of rebellion (though not with the likelihood of coups), while a prior coup has a statistically significant and positive association with civil war when controlling for inclusion (i.e., groups that seize power in a coup in a given year but then lose power in the subsequent year are more likely to rebel).¹²¹

¹²¹ The onset of a rebellion in the previous period is dropped from the model predicting coups because there are no cases where rebellion is followed by a coup in the following year. This is unsurprising for both political and coding reasons. Strategically, rulers facing active rebellions are unlikely to accord them a partial share of the state—which would further increase their military capabilities—without some kind of credible guarantees they will not leverage this to usurp power for themselves. For research purposes, an attempt to violently seize power in the context of an ongoing civil war will likely be coded as part of that conflict, rather than as a distinct coup event.

Table A.3.4.7: Interactive Effects of Past Outcomes and the Likelihood of Ethnic Inclusion, Coups and Civil War by Non-Ruling Groups in Africa, Independence-2013

	Ethnic Powersharing		Successful Coup		Rebellion Onset	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.56** (0.23)		1.15* (0.64)		-0.77* (0.42)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-0.61** (0.26)		-2.31** (0.91)		0.45 (0.43)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.05 (0.36)		-0.32 (0.63)		1.19** (0.53)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-0.84*** (0.30)		-0.90 (0.72)		1.14** (0.52)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>	0.22 (0.14)	0.22 (0.14)	-0.41 (0.34)	-0.49 (0.36)	-0.59*** (0.22)	-0.62*** (0.20)
<i>Log country population</i>	0.05 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.20)	0.03 (0.18)	-0.00 (0.18)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.10)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>	0.84*** (0.28)	0.81*** (0.29)	0.71 (0.46)	0.71 (0.45)	-0.02 (0.46)	0.08 (0.42)
<i>Former French colony</i>	0.60* (0.33)	0.55* (0.32)	0.28 (0.44)	0.22 (0.45)	0.19 (0.64)	0.14 (0.60)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.51 (0.38)	-0.49 (0.38)	-0.02 (0.87)	-0.00 (0.89)	-0.88 (0.78)	-0.85 (0.78)
<i>Year</i>	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
<i>Past coup</i>			1.47*** (0.51)	1.30** (0.51)		
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					0.29 (0.73)	0.31 (0.68)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.47 (0.59)	-0.53 (0.60)
<i>Ethnic powersharing (lag)</i>			-0.01 (0.55)	-0.11 (0.55)	-1.35*** (0.37)	-1.44*** (0.39)
<i>Successful coup (lag)</i>	3.55** (1.45)	3.55** (1.46)			3.15*** (0.87)	3.16*** (0.90)
<i>Rebellion onset (lag)</i>	-0.64 (0.67)	-0.60 (0.70)	[dropped]	[dropped]		
<i>t</i>	-1.88*** (0.15)	-1.87*** (0.15)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-83.96 (25.35)	-84.37 (25.57)	101.49 (59.47)	101.59 (58.73)	-98.78 (50.73)	-91.27 (51.89)
N	7120	7120	7072	7072	7137	7137
states	38	38	38	38	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.78	0.78	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.10

This table reports logistic regression estimates replicating results predicting interethnic powersharing (Models 1 and 2, following EP-5 and EP-6 in main paper), successful coups (Models 3 and 4, following SC-5 and SC-6), and civil war onset (Models 5 and 6, following CW-5 and CW-6). Control variables are added for lagged dependent variables of the other two outcomes (e.g. the occurrence of a coup or a rebellion onset in the previous year in models of ethnic powersharing). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

3.5 Models Using EPR 3.0

In the main paper we use EPR 2014 to run the analysis. EPR 2014 has data on ethnic powersharing through 2013 and has group-level data on 40 countries in Africa. An alternative dataset is EPR 3.0,¹²² which has coverage through 2010 and has group-level data on 37 countries. Though both stem from the original EPR 1.1 dataset and do not include major differences in their codings of access to state power in Africa, they do not correspond perfectly. The differences in the datasets are not substantial but they are noticeable when we reconstruct our threat capabilities' dyads using EPR 3.0. With EPR 3.0, there are more LH and LL dyads and fewer HH and HL dyads, as reported in Table A.3.5.1. We thus re-run the main models in the paper using EPR 3.0 to be sure the results are not sensitive to coding choices on group configurations made in EPR 2014.

Table A.3.5.1 Comparison of Threat Capabilities Dyads with EPR 2014 and EPR 3.0

Variable	EPR 2014 Frequency	EPR 3.0 Frequency
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	0.36	0.34
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>	0.42	0.37
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>	0.08	0.11
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>	0.14	0.18

Tables A.3.5.2-A.3.5.4 report the results of rerunning the main powersharing, coup and civil war models in the paper using EPR 3.0 data. The results are very similar. But with the shift in groups to the LH and LL dyads and the increased number of observations in these quadrants,

¹²² Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009.

we see an even more robust negative effect of mutually-low threat capabilities (LL days) on successful coups d'état.

Table A.3.5.2: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Powersharing with EPR 3.0

	EP-1	EP-2	EP-3	EP-4	EP-5	EP-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	1.04*** (0.33)		0.48** (0.22)		0.60** (0.23)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-1.21*** (0.45)		-0.57** (0.27)		-0.55** (0.28)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.15 (0.52)		0.05 (0.41)		-0.40 (0.41)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.28*** (0.39)		-0.66** (0.27)		-0.87** (0.40)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					0.45** (0.21)	0.48** (0.24)
<i>Log country population</i>					0.07 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					0.39 (0.28)	0.37 (0.30)
<i>Former French colony</i>					0.38 (0.37)	0.34 (0.37)
<i>Cold War</i>					0.82* (0.49)	0.87* (0.50)
<i>Year</i>					0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
<i>t</i>			-1.83*** (0.18)	-1.82*** (0.18)	-1.65*** (0.16)	-1.65*** (0.16)
<i>t²</i>			0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-0.46 (0.35)	0.58 (0.29)	4.26 (0.43)	4.73 (0.40)	-93.65 (39.57)	-95.94 (38.63)
N	6002	6002	6002	6002	5791	5791
states	35	35	35	35	35	35
pseudo r ²	0.04	0.06	0.75	0.75	0.77	0.77

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates predicting interethnic powersharing, replicating all results in Table 1 of the main paper, substituting the EPR 3.0 data for the EPR 2014 data. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

Table A.3.5.3: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Successful Coup with EPR 3.0

	SC-1	SC-2	SC-3	SC-4	SC-5	SC-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	1.78*** (0.50)		1.68*** (0.51)		1.35** (0.56)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-3.40*** (1.05)		-3.34*** (1.07)		-2.90*** (1.07)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.43 (0.53)		-0.33 (0.52)		-0.27 (0.54)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.95*** (0.69)		-1.78*** (0.65)		-1.64*** (0.59)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					-0.34 (0.48)	-0.55 (0.46)
<i>Log country population</i>					-0.29 (0.24)	-0.28 (0.23)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					-0.18** (0.08)	-0.13 (0.09)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					0.51 (0.43)	0.49 (0.43)
<i>Former French colony</i>					0.34 (0.43)	0.32 (0.41)
<i>Cold War</i>					0.00 (0.82)	-0.05 (0.82)
<i>Past coup</i>					0.90 (0.69)	0.76 (0.63)
<i>Year</i>					-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
<i>t</i>			-0.21** (0.11)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.10)
<i>t²</i>			0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-5.99 (0.46)	-4.21 (0.25)	-4.62 (0.71)	-2.91 (0.48)	38.56 (56.22)	47.87 (53.56)
N	5423	5423	5423	5423	5210	5210
states	35	35	35	35	35	35
pseudo r ²	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.14

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates predicting successful coups, replicating all results in Table 2 of the main paper, substituting the EPR 3.0 data for the EPR 2014 data. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

Table A.3.5.4: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Civil War Onset with EPR 3.0

	CW-1	CW-2	CW-3	CW-4	CW-5	CW-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	-0.74 (0.46)		-0.76* (0.45)		-0.89** (0.44)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		0.78 (0.51)		0.77 (0.51)		0.77 (0.49)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		0.63 (0.52)		0.65 (0.51)		1.13** (0.54)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		0.76 (0.55)		0.81 (0.54)		1.16* (0.65)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					-1.05*** (0.40)	-1.15*** (0.42)
<i>Log country population</i>					-0.29 (0.18)	-0.33 (0.19)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					0.10 (0.07)	0.14 (0.08)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					-0.52 (0.37)	-0.47 (0.39)
<i>Former French colony</i>					-0.22 (0.62)	-0.24 (0.60)
<i>Cold War</i>					1.01 (0.71)	0.99 (0.69)
<i>Past conflict</i>					-0.61 (0.64)	-0.58 (0.65)
<i>Ongoing rebellion</i>					-0.17 (0.71)	-0.18 (0.68)
<i>Year</i>					0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
<i>t</i>			-0.05 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.11)
<i>t²</i>			0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-4.37 (0.26)	-5.11 (0.41)	-4.06 (0.48)	-4.81 (0.73)	-97.46 (55.70)	-94.63 (56.33)
N	5423	5423	5423	5423	5210	5210
states	35	35	35	35	35	35
pseudo r ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.05

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates predicting civil war onset, replicating all results in Table 3 of the main paper, substituting the EPR 3.0 data for the EPR 2014 data. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and a given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

4. List of Ruling Groups and Non-Ruling Groups

Country	Years	Ruling Group	Non-Ruling Groups
Angola	1976-2013	Mbundu-Mestico	Bakongo Cabindan Mayombe Lunda-Chokwe Ovimbundu-Ovambu
Benin	1961-1963	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma)	South/Central (Fon) Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)
	1964-1965	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot, Goun)	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) South/Central (fon)
	1966-1967	South/Central (Fon)	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)
	1968-1989	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma)	South/Central (Fon) Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)
	1990-1995	South/Central (Fon)	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun) Southwestern (Adja)
	1996-2013	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma)	South/Central (Fon) Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun) Southwestern (Adja)

Botswana	1967-2013	Tswana	Birwa Herero/Mbanderu Kalanga Kgalagadi Mbukushu Twapong White Yeyi
Burundi	1963-2003	Tutsi	Hutu
Burundi	2004-2013	Hutu	Tutsi
Cameroon	1961-1982	Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	Bamileke Bassa/Duala Beti (and related peoples) Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders) Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc)
Cameroon	1983-2013	Beti (and related peoples)	Bamileke Bassa/Duala Fulani (and other Northern Muslim peoples) Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders) Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc)
Central African Republic	1961-1981	Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri, etc)	Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)
Central African Republic	1982-1993	Yakoma	Mbaka Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)
Central African Republic	1994-2002	Sara	Baya Mbaka Yakoma
Central African Republic	2003-2013	Baya	Goula Mbaka Sara Yakoma

Chad	1960- 1978	Sara	Arabs Muslim Sahel groups Toubou
Chad	1979- 1979	State collapse	
Chad	1980- 1990	Toubou	Arabs Hadjerai Muslim Sahel groups Sara Zaghawa, Bideyat
Chad	1991- 2013	Zaghawa, Bideyat	Arabs Hadjerai Sara Toubou
Congo, Rep	1961- 1963	Lari	Bakongo Batéké Mbochi Vili
Congo, Rep	1964- 1968	Bakongo	Batéké Lari Mbochi Vili
Congo, Rep	1969- 1976	Mbochi	Batéké Lari/Bakongo Vili
Congo, Rep	1977- 1990	Mbochi (proper)	Batéké Kouyou Lari/Bakongo Vili
Congo, Rep	1991- 1991	Lari/Bakongo	Batéké Kouyou Lari/Bakongo Vili
Congo, Rep	1992- 1997	Bembe	Batéké Kouyou Lari/Bakongo Mbochi (proper) Vili

Congo, Rep	1998-2013	Mbochi (proper)	Batéké Bembe Kouyou Lari/Bakongo Vili
Congo, Dem Rep	1961-1996	Ngbandi	Bakongo Luba Kasai Luba Shaba Lulua Lunda-Yeke Mbandja Mongo Ngbaka Other Kivu groups Tetela-Kusu Tutsi-Banyamulenge
Congo, Dem Rep	1997-1997	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Bakongo Luba Kasai Luba Shaba Lulua Lunda-Yeke Mbandja Mongo Ngbaka Other Kivu groups Tetela-Kusu
Congo, Dem Rep	1998-2013	Luba Shaba	Bakongo Luba Kasai Lulua Lunda-Yeke Mbandja Mongo Ngbaka Ngbandi Other Kivu groups Tetela-Kusu
Côte d'Ivoire	1960-1999	Baule (Akan)	Kru Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) Other Akans Southern Mande

Côte d'Ivoire	2000-2000	Southern Mande	Kru Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) Other Akans
Côte d'Ivoire	2001-2011	Kru	Baule (Akan) Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) Other Akans Southern Mande
Côte d'Ivoire	2012-2013	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	Baule (Akan) Kru Other Akans Southern Mande
Djibouti	1977-2013	Isaas (Somali)	Afar
Eritrea	1993-2013	Christians	Afar Kunama Other Muslims Saho
Ethiopia	1946-1991	Amhara	Afar Christian Eritreans Muslim Eritreans Oroma Somali (Ogaden) Tigry
Ethiopia	1992-2013	Tigry	Afar Amhara Anuak Beni-Shugal-Gumez Christian Eritreans Harari Muslim Eritreans Oroma Other Southern Nations Somali (Ogaden)
Gabon	1960-1967	Fang	Eshira/Bapounou Myene
Gabon	1968-2013	Mbede (Nzebe, Bateke, Obamba)	Eshira/Bapounou Fang Myene Nkomi Orungu

Ghana	1957-1965	Other Akans	Asante (Akan) Ewe Ga-Adangbe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi)
Ghana	1966-1969	Ga-Adangbe	Asante (Akan) Ewe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi) Other Akans
Ghana	1970-1971	Other Akans	Asante (Akan) Ewe Ga-Adangbe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi)
Ghana	1972-1981	Asante (Akan)	Ewe Ga-Adangbe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi) Other Akans
Ghana	1982-1999	Ewe	Asante (Akan) Ga-Adangbe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi) Other Akans
Ghana	2000-2008	Asante (Akan)	Ewe Ga-Adangbe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi) Other Akans
Ghana	2009-2012	Other Akans	Asante (Akan) Ewe Ga-Adangbe Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi)
Ghana	2013-2013	Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi)	Asante (Akan) Ewe Ga-Adangbe

Guinea	1959-1983	Malinke	Peul Susu
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Guinea	1984-2008	Susu	Malinke Peul
Guinea	2009-2010	[Non-EPR Group]	Malinke Peul Susu
Guinea	2011-2013	Malinke	Peul Susu
Guinea-Bissau	1982-1999	Papel	Balanta Manjaco
Guinea-Bissau	2000-2003	Balanta	Manjaco Papel
Guinea-Bissau	2004-2004	Papel	Manjaco
Guinea-Bissau	2005-2005	Balanta	Manjaco Papel
Guinea-Bissau	2006-2009	Papel	Balanta Manjaco
Guinea Bissau	2010-2013	[Non-EPR Group]	Balanta Manjaco Papel
Kenya	1964-1978	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana- Samburu Kamba Kisii Luhya Luo Mijikenda Somali
Kenya	1979-2002	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana- Samburu	Kamba Kikuyu-Meru-Emb Kisii Luhya Luo Mijikenda Somali

Kenya	2003-2013	Kikuyu-Mero-Emb	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu Kamba Kisii Luhya Luo Mijikenda Somali
Liberia	1947-1980	Americo-Liberians	Indigenous Peoples
Liberia	1981-1989	Krahn (Guere)	Americo-Liberians Gio Mano
Liberia	1990-1997	State collapse	
Liberia	1998-2013	Americo-Liberians	Geo Krahn (Guere) Mandingo Mano
Madagascar	1961-1972	Côtiers	Highlanders
Madagascar	1973-1975	Highlanders	Côtiers
Madagascar	1976-2001	Côtiers	Highlanders
Madagascar	2002-2013	Ethnicity irrelevant	
Malawi	1965-1994	Chewa (Central)	Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde) Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao)
Malawi	1995-2013	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao)	Chewa (Central) Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde)
Mali	1961-2013	Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic, etc)	Arabs/Moors Tuareg
Mauritania	1961-1977	White Moors (Beydan)	Black Africans Haratins (Black Moors)

Mauritania	1978- 1983	Haratins (Black Moors)	Black Africans Sahrawis White Moors (Beydan)
Mauritania	1984- 2013	White Moors (Beydan)	Black Africans Haratins (Black Moors)
Mauritius	1970- 1987	Hindus	Black Creoles Creoles Franco-Mauritians Gens-de-Couleur Muslims
Mauritius	1988- 2013	Hindi-speaking Hindus	Black Creoles Creoles Franco-Mauritians Gens-de-Couleur Marathis Muslims Tamils and Telugus
Mozambique	1976- 2013	Tsonga-Chopi	Makonde-Yao Shona-Ndau
Namibia	1991- 2013	Ovambo	Baster Basubia Coloreds Damara Herero, Mbanderu Himba Kavango Mafwe Nama San Whites
Niger	1961- 1990	Djerma-Songhai	Hausa Kanouri Toubou Tuareg
Niger	1991- 1995	Hausa	Djerma-Songhai Kanouri Toubou Tuareg
Niger	1996- 2011	Djerma-Songhai	Hausa Kanouri Toubou Tuareg

Niger	2012-2013	Hausa	Djerma-Songhai Kanouri Toubou Tuareg
Nigeria	1961-1998	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	Igbo Ijaw Ogoni Tiv Yoruba
Nigeria	1999-2007	Yoruba	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt Igbo Ijaw Ogoni Tiv
Nigeria	2008-2010	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	Igbo Ijaw Ogoni Tiv Yoruba
Nigeria	2011-2013	Ijaw	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt Igbo Ogoni Tiv Yoruba
Rwanda	1963-1994	Hutu	Tutsi
Rwanda	1995-2013	Tutsi	Hutu
Senegal	1961-1980	Serer	Diola Mandingue (and other eastern groups) Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur) Wolof
Senegal	1981-2012	Wolof	Diola Mandingue (and other eastern groups) Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur) Serer

Senegal	2013-2013	Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)	Diola Mandingue (and other eastern groups) Serer
Sierra Leone	1962-1967	Mende	Kono Northern Groups (Temne, Limba)
Sierra Leone	1968-1991	Limba	Kono Mende Temne
Sierra Leone	1992-1996	State collapse	
Sierra Leone	1997-1997	Mende	Kono Northern Groups (Temne, Limba)
Sierra Leone	1998-2002	State collapse	
Sierra Leone	2003-2007	Mende	Kono Northern Groups (Temne, Limba)
Sierra Leone	2008-2013	Temne	Kono Limba Mende
South Africa	1948-1993	Afrikaners	Blacks Coloreds English Speakers
South Africa	1994-2008	Xhosa	Afrikaners Coloreds English Speakers Ndebele Pedi (North Sotho) San South Sotho Swazi Tsonga Tswana Venda Zulu

South Africa	2009-2013	Zulu	Afrikaners Coloreds English Speakers Ndebele Pedi (North Sotho) San South Sotho Swazi Tsonga Tswana Venda Xhosa
South Sudan	2012-2013	Dinka	Anyuak Azande Bari Didinga Mundari Murle Nuer Shilluk Toposa
Sudan	1957-2013	Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla (Arab)	Azande Bari Beja Dinka Fur Latoka Masalit Nuba Nuer Other Arab groups Other Northern groups Other Southern groups Rashaida Shilluk Zaghawa
Tanzania	1965-2009	Mainland Africans	Maasai Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans) Zanzibar Arabs
Tanzania	2010-2013	Others Mainland (Christians and traditional religions)	Maasai Mainland Muslims Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans) Zanzibar Arabs

The Gambia	1966-1993	Wolof	Diola Fula Mandinka
The Gambia	1994-1994	Ethnicity irrelevant	
Togo	1961-1966	Ewe (and related groups)	Kabre
Togo	1967-2013	Kabre	Ewe (and related groups)
Uganda	1963-1965	Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lubara, Alur)	Baganda Basoga South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)
Uganda	1966-1969	Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)	Baganda Basoga South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) Teso
Uganda	1970-1971	Langi/Acholi	Baganda Basoga Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) Teso
Uganda	1972-1973	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	Asians Baganda Basoga Karamojong Langi/Acholi South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) Teso

Uganda	1974-1979	Kakwa-Nubian	Baganda Basoga Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur) Karamojong Langi/Acholi South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) Teso
Uganda	1980-1985	Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso)	Baganda Basoga Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) Karamojong South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)
Uganda	1986-1989	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	Baganda Basoga Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) Karamojong Langi/Acholi Teso
Uganda	1990-2013	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)	Baganda Banyarwanda Basoga Langi/Acholi Teso
Zambia	1965-2001	Bemba Speakers	Kaonde (NW Province) Lozi (Barotse) Luanda (NW Province) Luvala (NW Province) Nianja speakers (Easterners) Tonga-Ila-Lenge (Southerners)

Zambia	2002-2008	Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners)	Bemba Speakers Kaonde (NW Province) Lozi (Barotse) Luanda (NW Province) Luvala (NW Province) Nianja speakers (Easterners)
Zambia	2009-2011	Nianja speakers (Easterners)	Bemba Speakers Kaonde (NW Province) Lozi (Barotse) Luanda (NW Province) Luvala (NW Province) Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners)
Zambia	2012-2013	Bemba speakers	Kaonde (NW Province) Lozi (Barotse) Luanda (NW Province) Luvala (NW Province) Nianja speakers (Easterners) Tonga-Ila-Lenge (Southerners)
Zimbabwe	1966-1979	Europeans	Africans
Zimbabwe	1980-1981	Shona	Europeans Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)
Zimbabwe	1982-1987	Shona (minus Ndau)	Europeans Ndau (Shona sub-group) Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)
Zimbabwe	1988-1991	Shona (minus Manyika & Ndau)	Europeans Manyika (Shona sub-group) Ndau (Shona sub-group) Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)
Zimbabwe	1992-2013	Shona	Europeans Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)

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Tables from Main Paper

Table 1: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Ethnic Powersharing

	EP-1	EP-2	EP-3	EP-4	EP-5	EP-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	1.22*** (0.35)		0.62*** (0.21)		0.62*** (0.22)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-1.44*** (0.46)		-0.70*** (0.26)		-0.67** (0.26)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.26 (0.45)		-0.02 (0.34)		-0.11 (0.35)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.18*** (0.40)		-0.78*** (0.27)		-0.94*** (0.30)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					0.22 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)
<i>Log country population</i>					0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					0.80*** (0.27)	0.77*** (0.28)
<i>Former French colony</i>					0.63* (0.33)	0.59* (0.32)
<i>Cold War</i>					-0.48 (0.37)	-0.46 (0.38)
<i>Year</i>					0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
<i>t</i>			-2.10*** (0.16)	-2.09*** (0.16)	-1.85*** (0.14)	-1.84*** (0.14)
<i>t²</i>			0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-0.56 (0.34)	0.65 (0.23)	4.44 (0.37)	5.05 (0.34)	-83.20 (24.79)	-83.86 (25.07)
N	7404	7404	7404	7404	7127	7127
states	40	40	40	40	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.06	0.07	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.78

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates. The sample includes all politically-relevant non-ruling group-years in 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from independence (or 1946 for older states) through 2013. The dependent variable is whether the group's representatives were represented in the central government at the *Junior Partner* level or above (EPR 2014). Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and the given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last powersharing (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

Table 2: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Successful Coup

	SC-1	SC-2	SC-3	SC-4	SC-5	SC-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	1.77*** (0.59)		1.59*** (0.59)		1.15* (0.63)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		-2.84*** (0.82)		-2.73*** (0.83)		-2.28** (0.91)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		-0.32 (0.60)		-0.13 (0.59)		-0.33 (0.63)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		-1.76*** (0.68)		-1.33** (0.53)		-0.89 (0.67)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					-0.40 (0.34)	-0.50 (0.35)
<i>Log country population</i>					-0.14 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.19)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					-0.14 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					0.71 (0.43)	0.70* (0.42)
<i>Former French colony</i>					0.29 (0.39)	0.21 (0.40)
<i>Cold War</i>					-0.01 (0.85)	-0.00 (0.87)
<i>Year</i>					-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
<i>Past Coup</i>					1.48*** (0.51)	1.29** (0.52)
<i>t</i>			-0.28*** (0.10)	-0.29*** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.23** (0.09)
<i>t²</i>			0.01** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
constant	-6.27 (0.53)	-4.50 (0.26)	4.49 (0.72)	-2.87 (0.41)	103.35 (59.46)	104.20** (58.91)
N	7415	7415	7415	7415	7137	7137
states	40	40	40	40	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.14

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates. The sample includes all politically-relevant non-ruling group-years in 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from independence (or 1946 for older states) through 2013. The dependent variable is whether the group carried out a successful coup. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and the given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last successful coup (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

Table 3: Balance of Threat Capabilities and the Likelihood of Civil War Onset

	CW-1	CW-2	CW-3	CW-4	CW-5	CW-6
<i>HH threat capabilities</i>	-0.88** (0.43)		-0.88** (0.43)		-0.77** (0.39)	
<i>HL threat capabilities</i>		0.73 (0.54)		0.70 (0.54)		0.53 (0.44)
<i>LH threat capabilities</i>		1.05** (0.50)		1.11** (0.49)		1.07** (0.47)
<i>LL threat capabilities</i>		1.16** (0.45)		1.20*** (0.43)		1.12** (0.51)
<i>Log GDP per capita</i>					-0.65*** (0.21)	-0.68*** (0.19)
<i>Log country population</i>					0.04 (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)
<i>Number of ethnic groups</i>					-0.06 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.11)
<i>Institutionalized regime</i>					-0.25 (0.45)	-0.17 (0.40)
<i>Former French colony</i>					-0.05 (0.54)	-0.13 (0.54)
<i>Cold War</i>					-0.96 (0.83)	-0.95 (0.82)
<i>Year</i>					0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Ongoing Rebellion</i>					0.35 (0.73)	0.35 (0.68)
<i>Past Conflict</i>					-0.32 (0.61)	-0.33 (0.61)
<i>t</i>			-0.06 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)
<i>t²</i>			0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>t³</i>			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
constant	-4.51 (0.25)	-5.39 (0.38)	-4.10 (0.46)	-4.97 (0.68)	-83.00 (53.71)	-77.27 (55.44)
N	7422	7422	7422	7422	7144	7144
states	40	40	40	40	38	38
pseudo r ²	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.06

Notes: This table reports logistic regression estimates. The sample includes all politically-relevant non-ruling group-years in 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from independence (or 1946 for older states) through 2013. The dependent variable is whether the group initiated a major armed rebellion or insurgency against the central government. Threat capabilities independent variables (HH, HL, LH, LL) indicate whether the ruling group and the given non-ruling group, respectively, are above (high) or below (low) the median threat capabilities for the full sample. Cubic polynomials of time since last rebellion onset (t , t^2 , t^3) are included to account for temporal dependence. Standard errors are clustered by country and statistical significance is denoted by: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, and *: $p < 0.10$

Figures from Main Paper

Figure 1: Threat Capabilities, Self-Enforcing Powersharing and Coup and Civil War Risk

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p>H1: Powersharing and societal peace (despite high coup risk)</p> <p><i>Powersharing: Yes</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: High</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: Low</i></p>	<p>H2: War-prone ethnocracies</p> <p><i>Powersharing: No</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: Low</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: High</i></p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p>H4: Repressive minority rule (or unstable powersharing)</p> <p><i>Powersharing: No</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: Low</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: High</i></p>	<p>H3: Unstable, violent, exclusionary regimes</p> <p><i>Powersharing: No</i></p> <p><i>Coup risk: Low</i></p> <p><i>Civil war risk: High</i></p>

Figure 2: Distribution of Ruling Group-Rival Group Dyads by Balance of Threat Capabilities across sub-Saharan Africa, Independence-2013

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p><i>High-High (HH) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 2,652</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 36%</i></p>	<p><i>High-Low (HL) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 3,089</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 42%</i></p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p><i>Low-High (LH) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 617</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 8%</i></p>	<p><i>Low-Low (LL) Threat Capabilities</i> <i>N= 1,067</i> <i>Proportion of dyads: 14%</i></p>

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Powersharing, Coups and Armed Rebellion

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p><i>H1:</i> <i>P(Powersharing): 62.9%</i> <i>P(Successful coup): 0.6%</i> <i>P(Armed rebellion): 0.4%</i></p>	<p><i>H2:</i> <i>P(Powersharing): 35.3%</i> <i>P(Successful coup): 0.1%</i> <i>P(Armed rebellion): 0.7%</i></p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p><i>H4:</i> <i>P(Powersharing): 55.8%</i> <i>P(Successful coup): 0.4%</i> <i>P(Armed rebellion): 1.1%</i></p>	<p><i>H3:</i> <i>P(Powersharing): 39.9%</i> <i>P(Successful coup): 0.3%</i> <i>P(Armed rebellion): 1.2%</i></p>

Figure 4: Balance of Threat Capabilities and Powersharing in Africa

	Strong Rival	Weak Rival
Strong Ruling Group	<p>H1: Powersharing and societal peace (despite high coup risk)</p> <p>Examples: Benin (1965-1968;1991-1996) Ghana (1957-present) Kenya (1963-present)</p>	<p>H2: War-prone ethnocracies</p> <p>Examples: Ethiopia (before 1991) Mali (1960-present) Sudan (1956-present)</p>
Weak Ruling Group	<p>H4: Repressive minority rule (or unstable powersharing)</p> <p>Examples: Guinea-Bissau (1974-1980) South Africa (before 1994) Ethiopia (after 1991)</p>	<p>H3: Unstable, violent, exclusionary regimes</p> <p>Examples: Zaire/DRC (1960-present) Chad (1980-present) Liberia (1980-1998)</p>